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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appeal is taken from an order, dated March 10, 1989, by 
the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson of the Third Judicial District 
Court, dismissing the Amended Complaint of Sandy City and J, 
Newton Steven (collectively -Sandy City-) for declaratory relief 
in this consolidated action. Utah Code Section 78-2-2(3)(j) 
confers on this Court jurisdiction over the appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Sandy City's statement of the Issues Presented on Appeal 
generally encompasses the claims of its Amended Complaint, but 
does not set forth all of the issues on appeal, nor does so in 
objective terms. The issues decided by the district court in 
granting the motion to dismiss and appealed from are as follows: 
(1) Does Section 73-8-50, Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 
1989), of the Metropolitan Water District Act ("MWD Act") 
provide a procedure by which Sandy City can withdraw from 
a water conservancy district created under the Utah Water 
Conservancy Act (-UWC Act")? 
(2) Is the statutory grant of the power to levy 
taxes to water conservancy districts under Section 
73-9-15, Utah Code Ann. (1980), prohibited by the Utah 
Constitution? 
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(3) Does the Resolution Providing for the Issuance 
of Water Convervancy Revenue Bonds, adopted February 6, 
1987 ("Master Bond Resolution"), constitute a general 
obligation of the Salt Lake County Water Conservancy 
District ("District") requiring that an election be held 
for the approval of bonds issued thereunder? 
(4) Did the notice of the agenda for the regularly 
scheduled November 17, 1988 meeting of the board of 
directors for the District ("District Board"), at which a 
resolution authorizing the publication of notice of intent 
to issue bonds was discussed and passed, comply with the 
requirements of the Utah Open and Public Meetings Act 
("Open Meetings Act")? 
(5) Was the publication of notice of intent to 
issue bonds sufficient under the requirements of Section 
73-9-32(5), Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1989), and was it 
otherwise legally adequate in content and notice to the 
public? 
(7) Does the district court have statutory 
authority or inherent power to order, approve or fashion a 
procedure by which Sandy City could withdraw from the 
District or submit for public approval by election matters 
of District governance? 
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
Utah Const, art V. § 1 
Utah Const, art VI. § 28 
Utah Const, art XIII. § 5 
Utah Code Ann. § 11-14-21 (Supp. 1989) 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-8-50 (Supp. 1989) 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-9-30 (1980) 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-9-32 (Supp. 1989) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
PROCEEDINGS IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
Sandy City and J. Steven Newton, the mayor and a resident 
of Sandy City, filed an Amended Complaint seeking declaratory 
relief against the District. (R. 31-51. See Addendum)1 Sandy 
City challenged the District's taxing and bonding authority, and 
the adequacy of the District's recent notice of intent to issue 
revenue bonds and the agenda for the District Board's November 17, 
1988 meeting. Sandy City also asked the district court: (a) to 
rule that Section 73-8-50 permitted it to withdraw from the 
District by means of a vote of Sandy City residents, or (b) in the 
alternative, to fashion wholly new procedures for Sandy City to 
1
 References to the record shall be denoted as "(R. . ) " ; 
references to the Addendum A (or supplement) to the record shall 
be denoted as "(S. . ) . " 
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withdraw from the District and for District voters to vote on 
matters decided by the District Board.2 
The District moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint. 
(S. 67-79.) Sandy City opposed the District's motion and moved 
for partial summary judgment as to the District's taxing and 
bonding authority and Sandy City's right to withdraw from the 
District. (R. 53-69.) Sandy City filed several affidavits in 
support of its motion for partial summary judgment, which were not 
considered by the district court. (R. 124 (order); S. 226-68 
(affidavits).) The district court dismissed Sandy City's Amended 
Complaint. (R. 123-128; See Addendum.) 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
The sole factual framework before this Court is found in 
the Amended Complaint.3 (R. 31-51.) 
2
 Sandy City's action was consolidated with the 1953 action 
entitled In The Matter Of The Organization Of The Salt Lake County 
Water Conservancy District, Civil No. 92340, wherein the District 
was originally organized. (R.121-22.) Grand County Water 
Conservancy District and West Valley City intervened in the 
consolidated action as defendants. (R.124.) 
3 Sandy City included in its Statement of the Case information 
contained in affidavits filed in support of its motion for partial 
summary judgment and other documents not considered by the 
district court. (Appellants' Brief n. 2, 3, 6-16, 24-25, 29, 
31-34.) Reference to those documents is, therefore, improper on 
appeal. 
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Utah Water Conservancy District Act. 
1. In 1941 the Utah Legislature enacted the UWC Act. 
1941 Utah Laws ch. 99 (currently codified in Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 73-9-1 to -43 (1980 and Supp. 1989).) The Legislature declared 
that the Hconservation and development" of the State's water 
resources through the creation of water conservancy districts are 
a "public use" which would directly or indirectly benefit the 
entire State. Utah Code Ann. § 73-9-l(a)-(f) (1980). 
2. The UWC Act sets forth procedures for the organization 
of water conservancy districts as political subdivisions 
(quasi-municipal corporations) of the State, id. § 73-9-7(7)(b) 
(Supp. 1989). Jurisdiction to establish such districts, in 
accordance with legislatively specified requirements, is given to 
district courts upon petition by the landowners in a proposed 
district. See id. §§ 73-9-3, 4 (1980 and Supp. 1989). The UWC 
Act vests governance of such districts in a board of directors. 
Directors for multi-county districts, such as the District, are 
appointed by the Governor subject to the advice and consent of the 
Senate, from a list of names submitted to him by the governing 
bodies of the counties and cities within a district. Id. 
§ 73-9-9(l)(b) (Supp. 1989). 
4. Water conservancy districts are given broad powers to 
develop water resources and to provide water, both wholesale and 
retail, to customers within or without its boundaries. See id. 
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§ 73-9-13. Districts are empowered to levy taxes. See id. 
§ 73-9-15 (1980). Within statutory constraints, they are also 
empowered to add property to a district, id. § 73-9-29 (Supp. 
1989), and to exclude existing lands from a district, id. 
§ 73-9-30 (1980) . 
Organization of the Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District. 
5. The Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District was 
organized in 1951 by a Decree of Organization issued by the 
District Court. (R. 33, 44-49.) Over its history, the District 
has added significant additional property and now serves some 
450,000 persons. The property contained in Sandy City is 
generally included within the District,4 (R. 33), as is all of 
the property in Salt Lake County except for the incorporated areas 
of Salt Lake City and Alta. The District sells water to 19 
entities, most of which are public entities. 
Background of this Dispute. 
6. In 1988 Sandy City formally petitioned to join the 
Salt Lake City Metropolitan Water District ("MWD"), (R. 35-36, 
50-51), and the MWD conditionally accepted the petition in January 
1989. (R. 36.) In July 1988, Sandy City submitted a request to 
4
 Sandy City has been a member of the District since 1951. 
(R. 35.) Over the years, Sandy City has purchased water from the 
District, including at least five thousand acre-feet of water 
since 1983. Sandy City continues to receive the benefit of that 
water at the current time. 
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the District to disconnect or withdraw from the District. (Id.) 
That request was denied by the District Board on November 17, 1988 
as not being in the best interests of the public and public 
entities served by the District and because there were bonds of 
the District outstanding. (R. 36-37.) 
7. On November 17, 1988, the District Board also passed a 
resolution authorizing the publication of a notice of intent to 
issue bonds in an amount up to $26.5 million, the proceeds of 
which were to be used to pay for the much-needed acquisition of an 
additional 30/000 acre-feet of water, to fund a new pumping 
station, and to fund in part a new headquarters complex. 
(R. 37.) Plaintiff Newton, the Mayor of Sandy City, and Byron 
Jorgenson, the Chief Administrative Officer of Sandy City, both 
members of the District Board, voted against the resolution. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Introduction. This Court has already sustained the 
constitutionality of the UWC Act. Sandy City's concerns about the 
problems allegedly created by water conservancy districts should 
be addressed to the Legislature, not to this Court. 
2. Withdrawal from the District. Sandy City argues that 
Section 73-8-50 of the MWD Act governs the withdrawal of a 
municipality from a water conservancy di trict. Sandy City's 
interpretation leads to the absurd result under Section 73-8-50 
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that a city which holds an election on a proposed withdrawal from 
a water conservancy district must certify the election results to 
the board of directors of a metropolitan water district, even if 
the municipality has no intention of joining a metropolitan water 
district. Sandy City's argument is also inconsistent with the 
casual usage of the terms "district" and "water district" in the 
MWD Act, If these terms were to be given different meanings (as 
Sandy City suggests), the MWD Act would be confusing and 
nonsensical. Moreover, Sandy City's argument directly contradicts 
Section 73-8-1 which states that the MWD Act applies only to 
"water districts" created under the MWD Act, i.e., metropolitan 
water districts. Finally, the parallel property addition and 
withdrawal procedures in the MWD Act, as well as in the UWC Act, 
demonstrate that each act provides its own exclusive procedures 
for addition and withdrawal of property. 
Sandy City's construction of Section 73-8-50 is also 
inconsistent with the legislative history of the MWD Act. In 
1935, when the MWD Act was passed, there were no other water 
districts in existence and, therefore, the Legislature had no need 
to distinguish between metropolitan water districts and other 
"water districts." In addition, the title of the MWD Act, which 
strongly indicates of the Legislature's intent, states that the 
MWD Act provides only for the "exclusion of area" from a 
metropolitan water district. 
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3. Taxing Authority. This Court has already held that 
the Legislature may delegate the power of taxation to water 
conservancy districts. Because of the reliance of water 
conservancy districts, bondholders and the public at large on 
those decisions, that precedent should be followed in this case. 
The UWC Act does not violate the separation of powers 
clause in Article V, Section 1 the Utah Constitution. That clause 
operates to keep the three branches of government separate at the 
state level and does not prevent the delegation of the taxing 
power to quasi-municipal corporations. Moreover, Article XIII, 
Section 5 only limits the delegation of the taxing power to 
quasi-municipal corporations for matters of purely local concern, 
and not for matters of statewide concern, such as the construction 
of large scale water projects. Similarly, the UWC Act does not 
violate the "Ripper Clause" in Article VI, Section 28 of the Utah 
Constitution. Water conservancy districts are not special 
commissions. They have been created to deal with water 
development and wholesale — matters of statewide concern. 
4. Bond Election. Sandy City argues that Section 6.19 of 
the Master Bond Resolution provides for the levy of taxes at the 
maximum rate and, therefore, requires an election under Section 
73-9-32(1) to approve the bonds. However, Section 6.19 does not 
require the levy of taxes at the maximum rate and, in any event, 
does not constitute an obligation requiring an election because 
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the taxes are not levied to pay a debt, but rather to pay for the 
operation and expenses of the District. 
5. Bond Notices. Sandy City makes several technical 
attacks on the sufficiency of the District's bond and meeting 
notices. However, the District fully complied with all applicable 
notice requirements. 
6. Equitable Remedies. In the absence of express 
statutory authority, district courts do not have the power to 
fashion procedures for the withdrawal of property from water 
conservancy districts or for the governance of such districts by 
popular referendum. The enumeration of a district court's duties 
in the UWC Act impliedly precludes the existence of other powers 
and duties under that act. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE SELECTION OF THE "GOVERNANCE MODEL" FOR WATER 
DEVELOPMENT IN THE STATE RESTS WITH THE LEGISLATURE. 
In 1941, approximately six years after the passage of the 
MWD Act, the Utah Legislature authorized the creation of water 
conservancy districts to facilitate the conservation and 
development of the State's water resources in unincorporated and 
incorporated areas. This Court has already sustained the 
constitutionality of water conservancy districts and other kinds 
of districts on several occasions. See Patterick v. Carbon Water 
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Conser. Dist., 145 P.2d 503 (Utah 1944), overruled in part, 
Timpanocfos Planning & Water Manage. Agency v. Central Utah Water 
Conser, Dist., 690 P.2d 562, 572 (Utah 1984) (water conservancy 
districts);5 Barlow v. Clearfield Citv Corp., 268 P.2d 682 (Utah 
1954) (water conservancy districts); see also Branch v. Salt Lake 
County Serv. Area No. 2, 460 P.2d 814 (Utah 1969) (county service 
areas); Tvgesen v. Magna Water Co., 226 P.2d 127 (Utah 1950) 
(county improvement districts). 
Sandy City argues that the decision of the district court, 
which followed the prior decisions of this Court, was erroneously 
based upon a "simple governance model" which is no longer valid. 
(Appellants' Brief at 12.) Sandy City impliedly asserts that 
under existing circumstances, the proliferation of districts under 
various state statutes has created "serious local governance 
problems" in Utah which justifies a judicial re-examination of the 
constitutionality and propriety of such entities. (Id. at 14.) 
Sandy City's constitutional concerns amount to nothing 
more than dissatisfaction with the current operation of the 
District as authorized by state statute. The Legislature has 
already determined the appropriate "governance model" that will 
b
 The Timpanogos decision prospectively overruled Patterick 
only to the extent that Patterick sustained the judicial selection 
of the District Board as provided under the UWC Act prior to 1983. 
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maximize the public welfare by authorizing the creation of water 
conservancy districts and other kinds of districts. Lehi Citv v. 
Meilinq, 48 P.2d 530, 535 (Utah 1935) (it is within the 
prerogative of the legislature to determine how to promote the 
public welfare); Trade Comm. v. Skaoos Drug Centers, Inc., 446 
P.2d 958, 963 (Utah 1968) (a court should not pass upon 
desirability of legislation or choose between opposing political 
philosophies). Respect for legislative prerogatives requires this 
Court to follow its prior decisions in upholding the 
constitutionality of the statutes under which such districts have 
been created. 
II. SECTION 73-8-50 OF THE MWD ACT DOES HOT APPLY TO WATER 
CONSERVANCY DISTRICTS OR OTHERWISE PROVIDE A METHOD FOR 
SANDY CITY TO WITHDRAW FROM THE DISTRICT. 
Sandy City asserts that it may use the withdrawal-by-
election mechanism for metropolitan water districts in Section 
73-8-50 of the MWD Act to withdraw from the District. To arrive 
at that result, Sandy City notes that Section 78-8-50 uses the 
phrase "any water district" rather than the phrase "metropolitan 
water district,M as occasionally used elsewhere in the MWD Act. 
Sandy City argues that the Legislature's choice of language 
demonstrates that the withdrawal-by-election mechanism of the MWD 
Act was intended to apply to any and every "water district/" 
defined by Sandy City as a "special function government having 
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water as its central object," created under the various statutes 
of this state,6 (Appellants1 Brief at 20.) Sandy City's 
interpretation of the phrase -any water district'1 is inconsistent 
with the language, operation and legislative history of the MWD 
Act as well as the provisions of the acts creating the other 
entities that Sandy City calls Mwater districts.H All of these 
sources clearly reveal that the term -any water district" as used 
by the Legislature in the MWD Act in 1935 was meant to apply only 
to metropolitan water districts created under the MWD Act. 
A. THE MWD ACT MUST BE CONSTRUED AS A WHOLE 
The meaning of Section 73-8-50 must be taken from all of 
the words of that section and from the context of the MWD Act as a 
whole. See, e.g., Cannon v. McDonald, 615 P.2d 1268, 1270 (Utah 
1980); Metropolitan Water Dist. v. Salt Lake City, 380 P.2d 721, 
724 (Utah 1963) ("entire context of statute"); see also Jensen v. 
Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah 1984) 
("separate parts of an act should not be construed in isolation 
from the rest of the act"). The phrase "any water district" in 
6
 Sandy City has identified at least seven different types of 
entities that would qualify as water districts under its 
definition: irrigation districts, water conservancy districts, 
metropolitan water districts, special service districts, county 
service districts, drainage districts and water improvement 
districts. (Appellants1 Brief at 21 n.54.) 
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Section 73-8-50 should not be defined so as to conflict with other 
provisions in the MWD Act, see, e.g., Taft v. Glade, 201 P.2d 285, 
287 (Utah 1948), or to create absurd results, see, e.g. , Curtis v. 
Harmon, 575 P.2d 1044 (Utah 1978). 
1. The Words and Operation of Section 73-8-50 Do Not 
Support Sandy City's Intrepretation. 
Sandy City's interpretation of the scope of Section 
73-8-50 leads to an absurd construction of that section. Section 
73-8-50 provides that after an election has been held where the 
majority of the electors have*voted in favor of withdrawal, the 
"result [of the election] shall be certified by the governing body 
of such municipality to the board of directors of the district." 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-8-50 (1980) (emphasis added). "Board of 
Directors" is defined in Section 73-8-2 to mean a board created 
under Section 73-8-20, or in other words, the board of directors 
of a metropolitan water district. Id. §§ 73-8-2, 20 (1980 and 
Supp. 1989). Sandy City's interpretation of this section would 
require the withdrawing municipality to certify the election 
results, not to the board of directors of the water conservancy 
district from which the municipality was withdrawing, but rather 
to an unidentified metropolitan water district board. This 
construction of Section 73-8-50 is absurd because there is nothing 
in Section 73-8-50 (under Sandy City's interpretation) that 
requires a municipality to join a metropolitan water district 
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after withdrawing from a water conservancy or other type of 
district. Consequently, the metropolitan water district board to 
which the election results would be reported could be a complete 
stranger to the election with no interest therein.7 The proper 
construction of Section 73-8-50, limiting its application to the 
withdrawal of a municipality from a metropolitan water district, 
provides that the election results be certified to the board of 
directors of the municipal water district from which the 
municipality is withdrawing. 
2. The Other Provisions of the MWD Act Reveal that 
Section 78-8-50 Applies Only to Metropolitan Water 
Districts. 
The MWD Act refers to districts created thereunder in a 
variety of ways. This casual style indicates that the drafters 
had no special meaning intended by use of the phrase Many water 
district" as it appears in Section 73-8-50 other than to refer to 
districts created under the MWD Act. In addition, specific 
7
 Even if the phrase "board of directors of the district" were 
defined (in contravention of the statutory definition) as meaning 
the board of directors of the water conservancy or other kind of 
district from which the municipality was withdrawing, Sandy City's 
interpretation of Section 73-8-50 would still fail because several 
of the entities referred to as "water districts" by Sandy City 
(and allegedly subject to Section 73-8-50) do not have boards of 
directors to which the election results could be certified. 
Special service districts have "governing authorities," Utah Code 
Ann. § 11-23-2(3)(1986); water improvement districts have "boards 
of trustees," id. § 17-29-10.1; and drainage districts have 
"boards of supervisors," id. § 19-1-5. 
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provisions of the MWD Act, Sections 73-8-1 and 73-8-49, reveal 
that Section 73-8-50 applies only to withdrawal from metropolitan 
water districts. 
a. General 
Sandy City contends that the use of the phrases 
"metropolitan water district" and Hany water district" indicates 
that the Legislature intended the phrases to have different 
meanings because each term in the MWD Act was used advisedly and 
must be given meaning. However, the rule of construction advanced 
by Sandy City does not apply where the "content otherwise 
requires." Grant v. Utah State Land, 485 P.2d 1035, 1036 (Utah 
1971). The casual use of terms to describe metropolitan water 
districts in the MWD Act prevents application of that rule of 
construction in this case. 
The MWD Act does not define "district" or "water 
district." Numerous references to "districts" are contained in 
the MWD Act and are given in various styles,8 all of which from 
8
 References include "water districts", "such district", "such 
incorporated districts", "such metropolitan water district", "the 
district" (by far the most common reference), "metropolitan water 
district", "said district", "any metropolitan water district", 
"any such district", "any district", "a district", "any district 
incorporated under this chapter", "metropolitan water district 
formed hereunder", "said metropolitan water district", "any 
metropolitan water district incorporated under this chapter", "any 
metropolitan water district incorporated hereunder", "water 
district", "any district organized hereunder", and "any water 
district incorporated thereunder". 
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their context plainly refer to districts which are created under 
the MWD Act. To attribute a different meaning to each of these 
variations/ as suggested by Sandy City, would render the MWD Act 
incomprehensible. 
b. Section 73-8-1 
Section 73-8-1 specifically demonstrates that the 
term "water district" was used to designate a metropolitan water 
district created under the MWD Act. Section 73-8-1 reads as 
follows: 
This act shall be known as the "Metropolitan 
Water District Act" and shall apply to the 
incorporation, organization, government, 
maintenance and operation of the water 
districts herein provided for and described, 
and to the board of directors herein referred 
to. 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-8-1 (1980) (emphasis added). The only "water 
districts" whose "incorporation, organization, government, 
maintenance and operation" are "provided for and described" in the 
MWD Act, are metropolitan water districts. 
Sandy City's interpretation of Section 73-8-50 is 
inconsistent with Section 73-8-1 in that it would expand the scope 
and application of the MWD Act beyond the governance of the 
metropolitan water districts created in that act and would do so 
in a capricious, inconsistent manner. Moreover, the use of the 
phrase "water district" in Section 73-8-1 to mean metropolitan 
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water district indicates that a similar meaning should be given to 
the phrase "any water district" in Section 73-8-50. 
c. Section 73-8-49 
Section 73-8-49 also reveals that the 
withdrawal-by-election provision of the MWD Act applies only to 
metropolitan water districts. Sandy City argues that Section 
73-8-49(2) of the MWD Act, dealing with the addition of a 
municipality by election to a metropolitan water district, 
represents a parallel to the procedure allegedly permitting a 
municipal election for the withdrawal of a city from a water 
conservancy district (or other "water district") as provided in 
Section 73-8-50. Sandy City is correct that there is a 
parallelism, but that parallelism rebuts Sandy City's contention. 
The parallelism between these sections implies that 
Section 73-8-50, like Section 73-8-49(2), applies only to 
metropolitan water districts. Indeed, a similar parallelism of 
property addition and withdrawal procedures appears in the UWC Act 
(see Sections 73-9-29 and 73-9-30), which provide that property is 
added and withdrawn by petition of property owners and judicial 
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decree.9 Thus, the logical conclusion is that the Legislature 
provided internally parallel procedures for the addition and 
withdrawal of property under each act and that the procedures set 
forth in the MWD Act do not apply to the UWC Act. 
B. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE MWD ACT ALSO SHOWS THAT 
THE WITHDRAWAL MECHANISM IN THE MWD ACT APPLIES ONLY TO 
METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICTS. 
Whenever possible, a statute should be construed to 
further the legislative intent behind the act. See, e.g., Board 
of Educ. v. Salt Lake County, 659 P.2d 1030, 1033 (Utah 1983). 
The legislative history and purpose of the MWD Act clearly 
demonstrates that it only applies to metropolitan water districts. 
1. Sandy City's Argument Ignores the Fact that in 1935 
There Were No Other Water Districts, 
The MWD Act/ including Section 73-8-50, was enacted in 
1935. At that time, there were no other statutes authorizing the 
y
 The Legislature has also provided a unique method of property 
addition and withdrawal for most of the other entities referred to 
as "water districts" by Sandy City. See Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 11-23-25, 27 (1986) (special service district); id. §§ 17-6-25 
to -32 (1987) (water improvement district); id. §§ 17-29-10, 16, 
17 (1980 & Supp. 1989) (county service area); id. §§ 19-3-1, 
19-6-1 (1980) (drainage district); id. §§ 73-7-30 to -34, 39 to 
-42 (1980), (irrigation district). 
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creation of water districts in Utah,10 Thus, the drafters of the 
MWD Act had no need to distinguish metropolitan water districts 
from other types of districts in Utah. The reference in Section 
73-8-50 to Hany water district" in 1935 could only have referred 
to metropolitan water districts because no other kinds of water 
districts were authorized in Utah. Moreover, it is unlikely that 
the Legislature would have hidden a withdrawal mechanism of 
general applicability in the MWD Act without some indication of 
its existence in the statutes creating the other kinds of 
districts. 
2. The Title of the MWD Act Evidences the Legislature's 
Intent to Limit Section 73-8-50 to Withdrawal from a 
Metropolitan Water District. 
The title to the MWD Act reveals that it is to apply only 
to metropolitan water districts. The title reads as follows: 
An Act Providing for the Incorporation, 
Government and Management of Metropolitan Water 
Districts, Authorizing Such Districts to Incur 
Bonded Debt and to Acquire, Construct, Operate 
and Manage Works and Property, Providing for 
the Taxation of Property Therein and the 
Performance of Certain Functions Relating 
Thereto by Officers of Counties, Providing for 
10
 In the early 1900s, water users associations were formed in 
response to the federal Water Reclamation Act. In 1919, the 
Legislature passed an act enabling the creation of irrigation 
districts. 1919 Utah Laws ch. 68. There was no language in that 
irrigation district act to suggest that irrigation districts were 
considered to be water districts. 
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the Addition of Area Thereto and the Exclusion 
of Area Therefrom and Authorizing Municipal 
Corporations to Aid and Participate in the 
Incorporation of Such Districts, 
1935 Utah Laws ch. 110 (emphasis added). 
Under the usual principles of statutory construction, the 
title of the bill indicates the legislative intent with regard to 
matters expressed therein. See American Elec. Power Serv. Corp. 
v. State, 619 P.2d 314 (Utah 1980); Peffers v. City of Pes Moines, 
299 N.W.2d 675 (Iowa 1980)- The title of the MWD Act 
unambiguously states that the MWD Act provides only for the 
exclusion of area from metropolitan water districts. See also 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-8-1 (1980). Section 73-8-50 should be 
interpreted in accordance with the legislative intent derived from 
the title of the MWD Act as being limited to the withdrawal of 
municipalities from metropolitan water districts.11 
C. THE WATER CONSERVANCY ACT PRECLUDES SANDY CITYfS PROPOSED 
INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 73-8-50. 
Section 73-9-41 of the UWC Act provides that all other 
acts conflicting with the UWC Act or "otherwise interfering with 
1 1
 Furthermore, under Sandy City's interpretation of Section 
73-8-50, the MWD Act appears to violate Article VI, Section 22 of 
the Utah Constitution, which requires that no bill may be passed 
containing more than one subject, and that the subject of a bill 
be clearly expressed in the title. 
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the accomplishment of the purposes of this act . . . are hereby 
declared not operative and not effective as to this act." Sandy 
City's interpretation of Section 73-8-50 would interfere with the 
accomplishment of the purposes of the UWC Act because Section 
73-9-30 of the UWC Act plainly provides for the circumstances and 
conditions under which property may be withdrawn from water 
conservancy districts.12 There is no indication in the UWC Act 
(or the MWD Act) that the provisions of the MWD Act apply in whole 
or in part to water conservancy districts. In the absence of any 
such indication, Section 73-9-41 precludes the use of another 
withdrawal mechanism. 
III. THE TAXING POWER DELEGATED BY THE LEGISLATURE TO WATER 
CONSERVANCY DISTRICTS IS CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE. 
Sandy City contends that the delegation to water 
conservancy districts of the power to levy taxes violates several 
provisions of the Utah Constitution. Before dealing with Sandy 
City's specific arguments, two general points need to be made. 
12
 Under customary principles of statutory construction, the 
Legislature's placement of a property withdrawal mechanism in the 
UWC Act implies that it was intended to be the exclusive means of 
withdrawal. See 73 Am.Jur. 2d, Statutes, §§ 211-12 (1974). If 
the Legislature had intended the UWC Act to be governed by the 
withdrawal provision of the MWD Act, it would have either 
expressly incorporated that statute or set forth the 
withdrawal-by-election mechanism in the UWC Act itself. 
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First, the constitutionality of a statute must be presumed by this 
Court and Sandy City carries a heavy burden of persuasion to rebut 
that presumption. See, e.g., City of West Jordan v. Utah State 
Retirement Bd., 767 P.2d 530, 532 (Utah 1988). Every reasonable 
presumption must be indulged in and every reasonable doubt 
resolved in favor of constitutionality. See, e.g.. Branch v. Salt 
Lake County Serv. Area No. 2, 460 P.2d 814, 815 (Utah 1969). 
Second, this Court has already upheld the 
constitutionality of the taxing power of water conservancy 
districts. In Patterick v. Carbon Water Conservancy District, 145 
P.2d 503 (Utah 1944), this Court held that because a water 
conservancy district is a quasi-municipal corporation formed for 
public purposes, "it is within the discretion of the Legislature 
to grant it any powers, not expressly inhibited by the 
Constitution, to further such purposes, including the power of 
taxation.M id. at 511. The constitutionality of the taxing power 
of water conservancy districts was reaffirmed in Barlow v. 
Clearfield Citv Corp., 268 P.2d 682 (Utah 1954), in which the 
Court said: 
The Legislature intentionally placed on the 
district the power and duty to levy taxes on 
the property of the district. . . . Without 
this the districts would be greatly hampered 
and in many instances would be unable to 
accomplish their purposes. . . . Since there 
is no constitutional provision which prevents 
the Legislature from creating this kind of a 
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corporate entity . . • this statute is not 
unconstitutional. 
Id, at 688 (emphasis added). In order to accept Sandy City's 
argument, this Court would have to overrule these cases. This 
would also undermine the traditional means of conserving and 
delivering water in this State.13 The holding of this Court in 
Freeman v. Stewart, 273 P.2d 174 (Utah 1954) is applicable to this 
case. In Freeman, this Court refused to overturn cases upholding 
the constitutionality of county sanitation districts, and stated: 
In a well-ordered society, it is important that 
people know what their legal rights are, not 
only under the constitutions and legislative 
enactments, but also as defined by judicial 
precedent, and having conducted their affairs 
in reliance thereon, ought not to have their 
rights swept away by judicial decree. And this 
is especially so where rights of property are 
involved. The law laid down in these decisions 
has been acted upon and numerous improvement 
districts created and financed, so that it must 
be said to be a rule of property with respect 
to which the doctrine [of stare decisis] should 
apply with all its force. And it should be 
left to the legislature to make any change in 
13
 Millions of dollars in financing and extensive properties and 
arrangements dealing with the conservation and delivery of water 
in this arid State are governed by the statute and cases 
challenged by Sandy City, and have been relied upon by investors 
and residents of the State for decades. In addition, Sandy City's 
argument that the delegation of taxing power is unconstitutional 
would not only undermine the outstanding bonds of water 
conservancy districts throughout the State, but would also impair 
the outstanding bonds and future financings of other kinds of 
districts throughout the State. 
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the law, except perhaps in a most unusual 
exigency. 
Id. at 176. Consequently, this Court should follow its precedent 
and uphold the constitutionality of the UWC Act. 
A. ARTICLE V# SECTION 1 - SEPARATION OF POWERS 
Sandy City contends that the delegation to the District of 
the taxing power under Section 73-9-15 and the delegation to the 
district court of the power to confirm the boundaries of local 
government under Section 73-9-7,14 both of which are legislative 
powers, violates the separation of powers requirement in 
Article V, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution. That section 
provides: 
The powers of the State of Utah shall be 
divided into three distinct departments, the 
Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; 
14
 Sandy City contends that because district courts approve 
water conservancy district boundaries upon which tax jurisdiction 
is based, they are performing a non-delegable legislative 
function. The case cited by Sandy City, Doenges v. City of Salt 
Lake, 614 P.2d 1237 (Utah 1980), does not consider Article V, 
Section 1 of the Utah Constitution. While Doenges does say that 
setting boundaries is a legislative function, it recognizes the 
right of the Legislature to delegate that function, id. at 1238. 
See also Freeman v. Centerville City, Utah, 600 P.2d 1003 (Utah 
1979). Moreover, since the boundaries of a district are actually 
determined by landowners who submit the petition, a district 
court's confirmatin of those boundaries is merely a ministerial or 
administrative function which does not violate the separation of 
powers clause. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 73-9-4(7)(c), 7 (Supp. 
1989); Timpanogos Planning & Water Manage. Agency v. Central Utah 
Water Conser. Dist., 690 P.2d 562, 570-71 (Utah 1984) (cases cited 
therein), State v. Gallion, 572 P.2d 683, 687 (Utah 1977). 
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and no person charged with the exercise of 
powers properly belonging to one of these 
departments, shall exercise any functions 
appertaining to either of the others, except in 
the cases herein expressly directed or 
permitted. 
Utah Const, art. V, § 1. 
The general rule is that a legislature can delegate to 
municipalities appropriate quasi-municipal powers for local 
government without violating the implied principle of organic law 
that the legislature shall not delegate its general lawmaking 
power. One of such delegable powers is the power to tax. 
McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, § 4.13 (3d ed. 1988). There is 
no reason why the general rule should not apply to a 
quasi-municipal corporation such as the District, inasmuch as 
Section 73-9-7(7)(b) provides that water conservancy districts 
shall have all the powers of a municipal corporation.15 See id. 
§ 44.07 (3d ed. 1988) ("the taxing power may be delegated to 
. . . quasi-municipal corporations"). The Utah Supreme Court 
recognized this principle in Patterick when it said "it is within 
the discretion of the Legislature to grant [the water conservancy 
district] any powers, not expressly inhibited by the Constitution 
15
 Municipal corporations, as well as water conservancy 
districts, derive their legal authority from state legislative 
enactment. See Title 10 of the Utah Code Ann. 
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. . . including the power of taxation." Patterick, 145 P.2d at 
511. 
The separation of powers clause is intended to keep the 
three branches of government at the state level separate. As this 
Court once stated: "Article V, Section 1 is not directed towards 
the delegation of legislative power per se but proscribes the 
conferring of legislative functions on specified persons in the 
executive department to avert any potentiality for tyranny by 
concentrating power in these individuals." State v. Gallion, 572 
P.2d 683, 687 (Utah 1977) (emphasis added); see also Timpanogos 
Planning & Water Manage. Agency v. Central Utah Water Conser. 
Dist. , 690 P.2d 562 (Utah 1984) (delegation of legislative power 
to a "person" named in the Constitution as being in another branch 
of state government/ i.e., district court, was improper). 
Municipal and quasi-municipal entities are not described in the 
Utah Constitution as belonging to either the judicial or executive 
branches of state government. Consequently, the Legislature is 
not prohibited from delegating to such entities the authority to 
tax. 
Furthermore, the UWC Act does not present the problem that 
Article V, Section 1 was intended to prevent. The UWC Act does 
not allow any other entity to take power from the legislative 
department or to intrude upon its law making authority. See 
Gallion, 572 P.2d at 687 (constitution prevents government 
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branches from "aggrandizement of their policy . . . by exercising 
functions appertaining to another [branch]H). Moreover, the 
Legislature carefully limited both the purposes and scope of the 
taxing power granted to the District. There is no violation of 
the separation of powers provision in the letter or the spirit of 
the UWC Act.16 
B. ARTICLE XIII, SECTION 5. 
Sandy City attempts to bolster its separation of powers 
argument by pointing to Article XIII, Section 5 of the Utah 
Constitution, which, according to Sandy City, authorizes the 
Legislature to delegate taxing authority only to the "corporate 
authorities," i.e. municipalities, and not to water conservancy 
districts. (Appellants* Brief at 31.) Article XIII, Section 5 
provides: 
The Legislature shall not impose taxes for the 
purpose of any county, city, town or other 
municipal corporation, but may, by law, vest in 
the corporate authorities thereof, 
respectively, the power to assess and collect 
taxes for all purposes of such corporation. 
16
 Sandy City's argument that Article V, Section 1 prevents any 
delegation of the power to tax property "unless expressly 
permitted by the Constitution," (Appellants' Brief at 30), is also 
inconsistent with the well established principle that "State 
Constitutions are mere limitations, and not grants, of powers." 
Salt Lake City v. Christensen, 95 P.523 (Utah 1928); Lehi Citv v. 
Meiling, 48 P.2d 530, 535 (Utah 1935); see also State v. Eldredoe, 
76 P.337, 339 (Utah 1904) (taxing power). 
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Utah Const- art. XIII, §5. Sandy City's interpretation of 
Article XIII# Section 5 is incorrect. Article XIII# Section 5 
merely limits the State's power to impose taxes for the municipal 
purposes. It does not limit the State's power to delegate the 
power to tax to quasi-municipal corporations for public purposes. 
The Utah Supreme Court has already rejected an 
Article XIII, Section 5 challenge to the UWC Act in Patterick, 
which while not expressly mentioned in the opinion, was briefed by 
the litigants and was thus before the Court. Other decisions from 
this Court have consistently recognized that Article XIII, 
Section 5 only prohibits the Legislature from imposing taxes 
solely for municipal purposes, or in other words, for the sole 
purpose of raising revenue for a municipality. See, e.g., Merklev 
v. State Tax Comm'n., 358 P.2d 991, 992 n.3 (Utah 1961)("purposes 
of ... municipalities"); Freeman v. Stewart, 273 P.2d 174, 176 
(Utah 1954) ("purposes of a municipal corporation"); Best Foods v. 
Christensen, 285 P.1001 (Utah 1930) ("sole purpose of raising 
revenue" for municipality); Wright v. Standford, 66 P.1061 (Utah 
1901) ("county purposes"). 
Where the tax is levied for the benefit of the public at 
large, the prohibitions in Article XIII, Section 5 are 
inapplicable. In Salt Lake County v. Murray City Redevelopment, 
598 P.2d 1339 (Utah 1979), this Court rejected a challenge under 
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Article XIII, Section 5 to the taxing authority of a redevelopment 
agency. This Court stated that the redevelopment agency was "an 
arm of the State government, designed for State purposes" for the 
benefit of the public at large. Jjl. at 1342. The redevelopment 
agency confronted problems of a statewide nature and not merely of 
"local concern." Id. The Court concluded that the State, through 
the redevelopment agency, could levy taxes without infringing the 
Article XIII, Section 5 limitation on taxation for municipal 
purposes, id. at 1343. See also Tribe v. Salt Lake City Corp., 
540 P.2d 499, 504 (Utah 1975) (redevelopment agency); Branch v. 
Salt Lake County Serv. Area No. 2, 460 P.2d 814, 817 (Utah 1969) 
(improvement districts); Freeman v. Stewart, 273 P.2d 174, 176 
(Utah 1954) (sanitation districts).17 
The Utah Legislature has declared that the organization of 
water conservancy districts is not purely a matter of local 
1 7
 California courts have routinely upheld similar statutes 
against constitutional challenges under provisions almost 
identical to Article XIII, Section 5. The California courts have 
held that such statutes benefit the entire state and involve 
matters that are not of a "purely local character." Henshaw v. 
Foster, 169 P. 82, 84 (Cal. 1917) (metropolitan water districts); 
see also Pixley v. Saunders, 141 P.815, 818 (Cal. 1914) 
(sanitation districts); Peterson v. Board of Supervisors, 225 
P. 28 (Cal. App. 1924) (reclamation districts). Colorado courts 
have also routinely rejected such constitutional challenges. See, 
e.g., City of Aurora v. Aurora Sanitation Dist., 149 P.2d 662 
(Colo. 1944) (sanitation district); Milheim v. Moffat Tunnel Imp. 
Dist. , 211 P. 649 (Colo. 1922) (tunnel improvements). 
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concern, but rather is a matter of public welfare that directly or 
indirectly benefits the entire State. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 73-9-1 (1980). Such a declaration is entitled to Hrespect and 
weight by the judiciary and should not be overturned unless 
palpably erroneous." Utah Tech. Fin. Corp. v. Wilkinson, 723 P.2d 
406, 412 (Utah 1986). Moreover, the decisions of this Court have 
sanctioned the finding that large scale water developments are not 
purely municipal concerns. Judge Wolfe, in his concurrence in 
Lehi Citv v. Meilinq, 48 P.2d 530 (Utah 1935), stated: 
[T]he building of an immense water project to 
serve many cities is in itself of a magnitude 
and character as to take it out of the category 
of municipal functioning. 
Id. at 548. See also Barlow v. Clearfield City Corp., 268 P.2d 
682, 687-88 (Utah 1954). Water conservancy districts facilitate 
the coordination of various governmental entities for the purpose 
of water development which would not otherwise be feasible on a 
purely local level. Such coordination benefits all persons within 
the State. Consequently, a levy of taxes by a water conservancy 
district is not a tax for solely a municipal purpose within the 
meaning of Article XIII, Section 5. 
C. ARTICLE VI, SECTION 28 - "RIPPER CLAUSE" 
Sandy City argues that the water conservancy district is a 
-special commission- within the meaning of Article VI, Section 28 
of the Utah Constitution. That section provides: 
-31-
The Legislature shall not delegate to any 
special commission, private corporation or 
association any power to make, supervise or 
interfere with any municipal improvement, 
money, property or effects, whether held in 
trust or otherwise, to levy taxes, to select a 
capital site or to perform any municipal 
functions. 
Utah Const, art. VI, § 28. 
The decisions of this Court demonstrate that a water 
conservancy district is not a special commission. In Tygesen, 226 
P.2d 127 (1950), this Court held that the County Improvement 
District Act did not violate Article VI, Section 28. In that 
decision, the Court held that an improvement district, the same as 
a water conservancy district, was not a special commission: 
These improvement districts are similar to the 
Metropolitan Water Districts and the Water 
Conservancy Districts. . . . In all of these 
acts once the initiating agencies have acted 
and a district has been formed their functions 
cease and the governing body of the district 
assumes full control of the district and its 
properties. This court has held that the 
Metropolitan Water Districts and the Water 
Conservancy Districts organized under those 
Acts were separate and distinct arms of the 
government and not special commissions, boards, 
private corporations or associations within the 
purview of the constitutional prohibition. 
id. at 130 (citing Lehi City, 48 P.2d at 530 and Patterick, 145 
P.2d at 503)(emphasis added.) Moreover, in Patterick this Court 
held that the UWC Act was patterned after the Colorado Water 
Conservancy Act. Patterick, 145 P.2d at 505. In People ex rel. 
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Rogers v. Letford, 79 P.2d 274 (Colo. 1938), and People v. Lee, 
213 P. 583 (Colo. 1923), the Colorado Supreme Court specifically 
held that the board of directors of a water conservancy district 
was not a "special commission" within the meaning of a Colorado 
constitutional provision identical to Utah's Article VI, Section 
28. In Patterick, this Court cited Letford and Lee as persuasive 
precedent, notably citing Letford in holding that water 
conservancy districts constitutionally received the taxing power. 
In Lehi City, this Court held that the board of directors 
of a metropolitan water district did not constitute a "special 
commission." Lehi City, 48 P.2d at 535. In his concurrence, 
Justice Wolfe explained that the question of whether a particular 
agency is a "special commission" is determined, not from the 
intrinsic meaning of those words, but in light of the purpose of 
Section 28, which is 
to prevent the Legislature from interfering 
with the property and powers of municipal 
corporations through some other governmental 
agency specially set up for the purpose of 
doing that. 
id. at 547• Therefore, he concluded that if an agency is not set 
up to interfere with local government, then it is not a special 
commission. Justice Wolfe further explained that there is no 
interference with a municipal function when the entity in question 
performs work that the municipality could not perform, either 
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because of the magnitude or character of the project or because it 
was such a project which must necessarily serve more than one 
municipality. Id. at 548. He concluded that the building of 
large water projects to serve many cities is of such a magnitude 
and character. Consequently, the MWD Act did not violate 
Article VI, Section 28. Compare Salt Lake County v. Murray Citv 
Redev., 598 P.2d 1339 (Utah 1979) ("public agency created by the 
legislature to aid the state in some public work for the general 
welfare, other than to perform as another community government," 
is not a special commission); Tribe v. Salt Lake City Corp., 540 
P.2d 499, 502-03 (Utah 1975) (quasi-municipal corporation set up 
to address statewise problem, i.e. urban blight, is not a special 
commission); Salt Lake County v. Salt Lake City, 134 P. 560, 563 
(Utah 1913) (state tax on city for county detention facility 
involved state purposes, not merely "local affairs," and did not 
violate the Article VI, Section 28).18 
18
 Other states have upheld the constitutionality of similar 
entities against challeges under the "Ripper Clause." See, e.g., 
Henshaw v. Foster, 169 P. 82 (Cal. 1917) (metropolitan water 
district - involved more than "purely local affairs"); Pixlev v. 
Saunders, 141 P. 815 (Cal. 1914) (sanitation districts); Fellom v. 
Redev. Agency, 320 P.2d 884 (Cal. App.), appeal dismissed, 358 
U.S. 56 (1958) (blight is a matter of state interest not subject 
to the "Ripper Clause"); City of Aurora v. Aurora Sanitation 
Dist. , 149 P.2d 662, 667 (Colo. 1944) (sanitation district); 
Milheim v. Moffat Tunnel Imp. Dist., 211 P. 655, 655 (Colo. 1922) 
(tunnel construction); State ex rel. Normile v. Coonev, 47 P.2d 
637, 646 (Mont. 1935) (state water conservation board). 
-34-
The present view of the Court is in accord with Justice 
Wolfe's concurrence in Lehi City. In Municipal Building Authority 
v. Lowder, 711 P.2d 273 (Utah 1985), the Court held that a 
municipal building authority did not constitute a special 
commission. The Court construed "the prohibitions of Article VI, 
Section 28 narrowly so as to facilitate flexibility in local 
governmental finance.- Ijd. at 281 (citing Patterick, 145 P.2d at 
503) . 
Under the above-cited precedent, a water conservancy 
district is not a "special commission." As was set forth in the 
UWC Act, water conservancy districts were established to provide a 
statewide benefit through the development of the State's water 
resources. Utah Code Ann. § 73-9-1 (1980). The undertaking of 
large "engineering projects" for the development of water 
resources is not such a uniquely municipal function that it must 
be (or can be) undertaken solely at the municipal level. Lehi 
City, 48 P.2d at 548 (Wolfe, J., concurring); Barlow v. Clearfield 
Citv Corp., 268 P.3d 682, 687-688 (Utah 1954). The building of a 
large water project to serve many cities is itself of a magnitude 
and character so as to take it out of the category of municipal 
functioning. Water conservancy districts do not levy taxes for 
the purpose of supplementing local government, rather, these 
districts are formed to cooperate with such local governments in 
the development of state water resources. The Legislature's 
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creation of the important financing mechanism created in the UWC 
Act should be sustained.^ 
IV. SECTION 6.19 OF THE MASTER BOND RESOLUTION DOES NOT REQUIRE 
THE LEVY OF TAXES OR FEES AT THE MAXIMUM RATE, NOR DOES IT 
CONSTITUTE AN OBLIGATION REQUIRING AN ELECTION. 
Sandy City alleges that Section 6.19 of the Master Bond 
Resolution contains Hterms and conditionsM which, directly or 
indirectly, bind the District or its Board to set fees or levy 
taxes at the maximum rate contrary to their lawful authority, and 
i9
 Sandy City argues that a court must undertake an "intense 
factual inquiry" to determine whether a violation of the "Ripper 
Clause" has occurred. (Appellants' Brief at 37-38 (citing City of 
West Jordan v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 767 P.2d 530 (Utah 
1989).) However, West Jordan did not reach the "special 
commission" requirement, but assumed for the purpose of argument 
that the state retirement board was a special commission. Id. at 
533. Moreover, the inquiry required for the balancing test in 
West Jordan consisted of an evaluation of the statutory 
characteristics of the district, not the subjective criticisms 
leveled at the District in Sandy City's affidavits. To the extent 
that the West Jordan analysis is relevant to the special 
commission issue, the UWC Act satisfies the balancing test 
described therein. Water conservation involves statewide 
interests and entails operations often beyond the capabilities of 
single municipalities. Local governments and the populace within 
a district also retain some control over water conservancy 
districts. Although an election is not required to create a 
district, a district cannot be formed if the petition is opposed 
by 20% of the landowers in the district. Utah Code Ann. § 73-9-7 
(Supp. 1989). Moreover, the issuance of bonds either requires an 
election, or permits an election upon the filing of a petition 
signed by 5% of the electors in a district. Id. § 73-9-32. 
Finally, a district board is composed of persons selected from a 
small pool of candidates supplied by each governmental entity in 
the district. Id. § 73-9-9. In fact, Sandy City has two 
representatives on the District Board. 
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constitute a general obligation of the District so as to require 
an election. Section 6.19 of the Master Bond Resolution provides 
as follows: 
Lew of Tax to Pav Operation and Maintenance 
Costs. The Issuer shall, so long as any of the 
Bonds or Contracts are Outstanding, levy 
annually the tax of .0004 on the dollar, or the 
maximum amount of such different annual levy as 
may be hereafter provided for by law, of 
assessed valuation of taxable property within 
the Issuer or so much thereof as shall be 
necessary, for payment of Operation and 
Maintenance Costs pursuant to the provisions of 
Section 73-9-16, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended. 
Section 6.19 does not bind the District or its Board to 
set fees or levy taxes at the maximum rate, nor does it bind the 
District or its Board to do anything contrary to their lawful 
authority. It obligates the District to levy taxes only to the 
extent that the taxes are (a) necessary to pay the District's 
operation and maintenance costs, and (b) within the maximum amount 
provided for by law.20 The taxes are to be levied only pursuant 
to the provisions of Section 73-9-16 of the Act. In other words, 
zu
 Sandy City cites paragraph 16 of an "Order, Statement of 
Material Facts, Findings and Conclusions" adopted August 20, 1987 
in the Hi-Country Estates Phase II matter, which generally refers 
to Section 6.19 as providing a maximum tax. This reference, 
however, is not accurate, was made in an uncontested matter and 
was intended merely as a summary. In any event, that statement 
cannot modify the actual language of Section 6.19, which plainly 
requires the District to levy only so much of the tax as shall be 
necessary to pay operation and maintenance expenses. 
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the District's obligation to levy taxes under Section 6.19 of the 
Master Bond Resolution is no broader than the District's 
authorization to do so under Section 73-9-16 of the Act. 
Furthermore, the District is authorized under Section 73-9-31(3) 
of the Act to agree in the Master Bond Resolution to levy the 
taxes provided for in Section 73-9-16 for the payment of annual 
operation and maintenance costs. 
The District's obligation under Section 6.19 of the Master 
Bond Resolution is not a general obligation of the District and 
does not require an election. Section 73-9-32(1) of the Act 
requires an election for bonds or long-term financial obligations 
of a similar magnitude. If future costs will be payable annually 
as they arise—and if an extraordinary source of income will not 
be required for the payments, but instead the payments will be 
made from ordinary sources of income and revenues for the 
year—then voter approval is not required for the District to 
agree today to pay such future costs. In Section 6.19 of the 
Master Bond Resolution the District has agreed to pay future 
operation and maintenance costs from taxes it is authorized to 
levy, but only on an annual pay-as-you-go basis. The taxes, if 
any, collected under Section 6.19 of the Master Bond Resolution 
are not pledged to pay the bonds of the District. The District 
has merely committed itself in Section 6.19, as it is entitled to 
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do under Section 73-9-16 of the Act, to levy limited taxes for the 
payment of operation and maintenance expenses, not for the payment 
of the bonds• Such taxes are merely incidental to the bonds 
issued under the Master Bond Resolution. Consequently, under 
Section 73-9-32(4), no election is required for such bonds except 
as provided in Section 73-9-32(5).21 
V. THE 1988 BOND RESOLUTION AND NOTICES THEREFOR ARE LEGALLY 
PROPER, 
In its Third Claim for Relief, Sandy City contends that 
the notices with respect to the proposed bonds and the 
November 17, 1988 meeting agenda were legally inadequate under 
truth in taxation legislation, the Open Meetings Act, the 
Municipal Bond Act, the UWC Act and the due process clause. Each 
of Sandy City's claims is without merit. 
21
 This same rationale was used by this Court in evaluating the 
application of the election requirement in Article XIV, Section 3 
of the Utah Constitution to the District. Patterick, 145 P.2d at 
511-12. The Utah Supreme Court has made it clear that a 
contractual obligation created today to pay costs incurred in 
future years is not debt within the meaning of Article XIV, 
Section 3 of the Utah Constitution, as long as the costs are to be 
paid in the years in which they are incurred. Voter approval is 
not required for obligations that are to be discharged on an 
annual pay-as-you-go basis. See Municipal Bldg. Auth. v. Lowder, 
711 P.2d 273 (Utah 1985); Barlow v. Clearfield Citv Corp., 268 
P.2d at 682; Barnes v. Lehi City, 279 P. 878 (Utah 1929); Bair v. 
Lavton City, 307 P.2d 895 (Utah 1957). 
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A. THE DISTRICTS LEVY DOES NOT VIOLATE THE TRUTH IN 
TAXATION LEGISLATION. 
Sandy City's contention that the District's levy of taxes 
violates "truth in taxation*1 legislation has no discernible 
basis• Sandy City does not contend that there have been tax 
increases levied in any year contrary to that legislation. 
Rather, Sandy city argues that the commitment to tax at maximum 
levels renders meaningless any public hearing on future tax 
increases. However, as the District is not obligated to tax 
revenues at maximum levels, Sandy City's argument has no merit. 
(See IV, supra.) 
B. THE NOVEMBER 17, 1988 AGENDA WAS LEGALLY SUFFICIENT UNDER 
THE OPEN MEETINGS ACT. 
Section 52-4-6 of the Open Meetings Act governs the giving 
of notice for meetings of public bodies. Utah Code Ann. § 52-4-6 
(1989). Subsection (2) of that section simply requires that the 
notice shall include "the agenda, date, time and place of 
meetings." Id.. The form of the notice for the November 17, 1988 
meeting of the Board of Directors of the District plainly gives 
the date, time, place and agenda of the meeting, and includes 
reference to an item "Notice of Intent to Issue Bonds." That 
reference informs the public of the existence of a bonding issue 
on the agenda, and is sufficient notice to prompt further inquiry 
by any interested member of the public. 
-40-
While there is no Utah case on point, cases from other 
jurisdictions indicate that the District's notice of intent to 
issue bonds was sufficient.22 In Meacham Contracting Co. v. 
Kleiderer, 142 S.W. 720 (Ky. Ct. App. 1912)/ the court considered 
the sufficiency of a council meeting notice Mto consider 
ordinances.M The state statute required that the meeting notice 
••shall designate the purpose of the same, and no other business 
shall be considered.- While the court found the notice reference 
too vague, it wrote: 
The notice should specify the purpose of the 
meeting with such fulness and accuracy as to 
give reasonable information of the business it 
is proposed to transact at the special meeting. 
* * * 
We do not think it necessary that the 
notice should designate accurately or in detail 
the character of business that will be brought 
before the council. We do not wish to give the 
words in the statute a narrow construction or 
one that would require the exercise of 
particular care in the choice of words to be 
used in the notice. A practical common sense 
observation of the statute does not demand this 
2 2
 The case cited by Sandy City, Grindstone Butte Mutual Canal 
Co. v. Idaho Power Co., 574 P.2d 902 (Idaho 1978)/ is 
distinguishable from the facts of this case. In Grindstone, the 
agency sent out a notice of a general rate increase/ but not that 
the rate structure applicable to certain businesses would be 
modified and require such businesses to bear a higher proportion 
of the increase. I_d. at 906-07. In the current situation, 
however, there is no such hidden agenda. 
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strictness; but neither should its purpose be 
defeated by a loose construction that would 
leave it without meaning or effect. For 
example/ if this notice had read "ordinances 
relating to street improvements/M or 
"ordinances that have had their first reading/" 
or "ordinances relating to revenue and 
taxation/" or "the granting of franchises/" or 
"ordinances relating to the police or fire 
department/" would be considered/ although the 
notice might not specify the particular subject 
under these general titles that would be 
considered, it would yet give information of 
the scope of the business to be transacted/ and 
no person of ordinary intelligence would be 
deceived or misled by it. . . . The statute 
does not give the form of the call or notice/ 
and it will be deemed sufficient if it merely 
designate in general terms the purpose of the 
meeting. Details are unnecessary. 
Id. at 721-23. That logic applies here and demonstrates the 
adequacy of the meeting notice.23 See also Andrews v. 
Independent School Dist. No. 29, 737 P.2d 929 (Okla. 1987); Santa 
Barbara School Dist. v. Superior Court, 530 P.2d 605 (Cal. 1975). 
C, SECTION 73-9-32(5) PRESCRIBES THE REQUIREMENT FOR 
PUBLICATION OF NOTICE OF THE INTENT TO ISSUE REVENUE 
BONDS. 
Section 73-9-32(5) governs the notice requirement for a 
proposed bond issue where the bonds are issued by a water 
23 The Plaintiff J. Steven Newton, the Mayor of Sandy City, is 
member of the District Board and was in attendance at the 
November 17/ 1988 meeting. Because the plaintiffs had adequate 
notice of the agenda and were actually present at the meeting, 
they have no standing to challenge the adequacy of the agenda. 
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conservancy district and are to be repaid from revenues. Utah 
Code Ann. § 73-9-32(5)(Supp. 1989). That section directs that 
notice of the intention to issue such bonds "be published once in 
a newspaper of general circulation in the district." Id. 
(emphasis added). Such a notice was authorized by resolution of 
the Board of Directors of the District on November 17, 1988, and 
the notice was published in The Salt Lake Tribune pursuant thereto 
on November 19, 1988. The publication requirement set forth in 
Section 73-9-2 applies only when the term "publication" is used in 
the UWC Act and where there is "no manner specified therefor." 
Id. §73-9-3. Section 73-9-32(5) clearly specifies the manner for 
publication, and the more general requirements set forth in 
Section 73-9-2 are thus inapplicable. Consequently, the single 
publication was legally sufficient. 
D. THE DISTRICT GAVE PROPER NOTICE OF THE INTENT TO ISSUE 
BONDS UNDER THE MUNICIPAL BOND ACT. 
Sandy City is incorrect in asserting that the Municipal 
Bond Act requires the publication of "notice of bonds to be 
issued." The Municipal Bond Act in fact makes the publication of 
notice of bonds to be issued optional. 
The governing body of any public body may 
provide for the publication of any resolution 
or other proceeding adopted by it under this 
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chapter in the ''official newspaper" designated 
under Subsection (1)• 
(3) In case of a resolution or other 
proceeding providing for the issuance of bonds, 
the governing body may, in lieu of publishing 
the entire resolution or other proceeding, 
publish a notice of bonds to be issued . . . . 
id. § 11-14-21(2) and (3) (Supp. 1989) (emphasis added). The 
failure to publish such a notice does not affect the validity of 
the bonds, but rather prevents the District from taking advantage 
of the 30 day statute of limitation provided in the Municipal Bond 
Act. Id. §11-14-21(4). In any event, Section 11-14-21 plainly 
contemplates a single publication. 
E. THE DISTRICTS NOTICES WERE NOT IMPERMISSIBLY VAGUE. 
Sandy City's discussion about due process is puzzling. 
The District can see no connection between a pre-termination 
hearing for a public employee and the issuance of bonds or the 
levy of taxes. No property rights are affected in this case. The 
acquisition by the District of water rights from third parties 
does not impair any property right that Sandy City may have. 
Moreover, the question of the issuance of bonds and of imposing 
general taxes is not a matter which is subject to due process 
notice considerations. See Ampco Printing v. Citv of New York, 
197 N.E.2d 285 (N.Y. 1964). So long as statutory procedures are 
followed, including compliance with the Open Meetings Law, Sandy 
City has no separate right, constitutional or otherwise, to a 
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public hearing prior to the decision to undertake a project/ to 
issue bonds, or to levy a tax. In any event, the statutory notice 
requirements followed by the District in this case should satisfy 
any due process requirement that may exist. 
VI. DISTRICT COURTS LACK JURISDICTION TO FASHION EQUITABLY NEW 
REMEDIES FOR THE DISTRICT. 
In its First and Fourth Claims for Relief, Sandy City 
asks the court to fashion equitably new procedures for the 
governance of the District concerning the withdrawal of Sandy City 
from the District and an election for voters to approve the 
District's new headquarters building. Such remedies are beyond 
the court's jurisdiction and procedurally improper. 
A. THE PROCEDURES FOR GOVERNANCE OF A WATER CONSERVANCY 
DISTRICT ARE EXCLUSIVELY WITHIN THE PROVINCE OF THE 
LEGISLATURE. 
Water conservancy districts are statutory creatures, whose 
rights, powers, restrictions and procedures are governed by the 
UWC Act. The UWC Act assigns a limited role to district courts. 
Pursuant to specific criteria, they establish districts, Utah Code 
Ann. § 73-9-3 (1980), and subdistricts, i£. § 73-9-14, and have 
continuing jurisdiction "of land and other property proposed to be 
included in said district or affected by said district," id. 
§ 73-9-6. Courts further have a limited role in the procedure for 
inclusion of additional land in a district, id. § 73-9-29. Upon 
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specific request by a district/ a court examines and determines 
the validity of any action taken by the district, id. § 73-9-36. 
However, contrary to Sandy City's assertions, district courts 
nowhere in the UWC Act are given general supervisory or 
administrative power over water conservancy districts. In a case 
involving improvement districts, the Utah Supreme Court wrote 
about the UWC Act: 
[I]n the Water Conservancy Act the district 
courts upon petition of a specified percentage 
of property owners were the agencies through 
which the districts could be established . . . 
once the initiating agencies [the district 
courts] have acted and a district has been 
formed their functions cease and the governing 
body of the district assumes full control of 
the district and its properties. 
Tygesen v. Magna Water Co., 226 P.2d 127, 130 (1950) (emphasis 
added). 
Sandy City's request to have the district court promulgate 
in equity new and additional procedures for withdrawal of property 
from the District and for voter approval of District Board 
decisions would require the lower court to undertake a legislative 
function. Such action is not within the power of the courts and 
should be left to legislative prerogatives. In a case involving a 
request for judicial exclusion of property from a utility 
district, the Supreme Court of Tennessee wrote: 
Where the Legislature has fixed the boundaries 
of a corporation such as this, this exercise of 
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power by the Legislature is a legislative power 
and not a judicial one, and hence it is not 
subject to judicial revision. 
Consolidated Gray-Fordtown-Colonial Hts. Util. Dist. v. O'Neill, 
354 S.W.2d 63, 65 (Tenn. 1962). The Colorado Supreme Court, in 
reviewing a request for judicial disconnection from a 
municipality, wrote: 
There exists no inherent power in a court to 
grant a disconnection. The power of annexation 
and disconnection is essentially legislative 
and absent an express statutory authorization 
the court lacked jurisdiction to enter the 
questioned decree. 
City of Littleton v. Wagenglast, 338 P.2d 1025, 1028 (Colo. 
1959). See also Punke v. Village of Elliott, 5 N.E.2d 389, 392 
(111. 1936); Richards v. Citv of Tustin, 37 Cal.Rptr. 124 (Cal. 
App., 4th Dist. 1964). In the absence of an express delegation to 
courts, Sandy City's redress must be sought in the Legislature and 
not here. 
B. BECAUSE THE UWC ACT GRANTS CERTAIN SPECIFIC POWERS TO THE 
DISTRICT COURT, IT IMPLIEDLY EXCLUDES ALL OTHERS. 
Under general rules of statutory construction in Utah, 
where a statute grants a power or right the powers not mentioned 
in the enumeration are intended to be excluded. 73 Am.Jur.2d, 
Statutes, §§ 211-12 (1974); see also Great Salt Lake Auth. v. 
Island Ranching Co., 414 P.2d 963, 966 (Utah 1966). The UWC Act 
-47-
provides a specific procedure for the exclusion of property from 
conservancy districts upon the petition of the owners in fee of 
lands in a district. Utah Code Ann. § 73-9-30 (1980). In this 
case, Sandy City, and not the owners in fee of any lands in the 
District, submitted to the District the request for exclusion of 
lands. Therefore, Sandy's request was not proper under section 
73-9-30. Moreover, the existence of § 73-9-30 impliedly excludes 
any other disconnection procedure which this Court might 
consider. Similarly, the UWC Act specifically provides that a 
district, on its own petition, can seek judicial confirmation of 
its actions. See id. § 73-9-36. Therefore, the Act impliedly 
excludes judicial review of District decisions without District 
request, such as the decision on the headquarters building or the 
denial of Sandy's request to disconnect. Finally, the UWC Act 
requires voter approval of general obligation bonds and contracts 
and for a petition procedure to require voter approval of revenue 
bonds. See id. § 73-9-32 (Supp. 1989). Therefore, it impliedly 
excludes electorate review or approval of any other District 
action. 
C. SANDY CITY'S ASSERTED BASES FOR BROAD EQUITY JURISDICTION 
OF THE DISTRICT COURT DO NOT APPLY UNDER THE ACT. 
Sandy City asserts that the district court has on prior 
occasions recognized that it has powers beyond those expressed in 
the UWC Act to permit exclusion of the lands from the District. 
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(Appellants' Brief at 48.) Sandy City bases its argument on the 
fact that the District cited Rule 60(b)(7) in a prior petition to 
the district court for exclusion of lands in Hi-Country Estates 
Phase II from the District. However, Sandy City apparently is 
unaware that the petition to exclude Hi-Country Estates was made 
because the District never extended water services, either retail 
or wholesale, to the land involved in that project. Therefore, 
the Decree initially including those lands was erroneous in that 
sense. Here, however, Sandy City does not contend that such error 
occurred. More importantly, the petition in the Hi-Country 
Estates Phase II matter generally complied with the procedures 
outlined in Section 73-9-30, unlike Sandy City's request. 
Sandy City also argues that "authority for broad equity 
jurisdiction" is established by the case law and statutory 
language allowing the severance of unconstitutional provisions or 
clauses as a "savings" mechanism. (Id. at 48-49.) However, the 
power of a court to sever unconstitutional clauses or provisions 
from sections or acts is inherently deferential to the 
Legislature's lawmaking power and, indeed, is chiefly pursuant to 
legislative direction, such as in the case of the UWC Act's 
savings clause. No equity jurisdiction to fashion new withdrawal 
procedures on an equal basis with the Legislature can be derived 
therefrom. 
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Sandy City finally argues that the rule of statutory 
construction that words will be construed to effectuate the 
intention and purposes of the Legislature supports a broad equity 
jurisdiction of the district court in this case. (Id. at 49.) 
However, that rule of construction respects the Legislature's 
singular role in lawmaking by having courts seek to effectuate the 
Legislature's intention, rather than elevating the court to a 
co-equal lawmaking status with the Legislature. That rule 
provides no authority for the proposition that courts have 
inherent equitable powers to judicially create new procedures in 
addition or contrary to those provided by the Legislature in the 
UWC Act. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, the District asks this Court to 
follow its prior decisions and to affirm the decision of the lower 
court. 
DATED this I'"^ day of August, 1989. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Brent W. Todd 
James S. Jardine 
£ick B. Hoggard 
RBH+220 
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Article V, Section 1 
Article VI, Section 28 
Article XIII, Section 5 
ARTICLE V 
DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS 
Section 
1. [Three departments of government.] 
Section 1. [Three departments of government ] 
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided 
into three distinct departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the 
Judicial; and no person charged with the exercise of powers properly 
belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any functions 
appertaining to either of the others, except in the cases herein expressly 
directed or permitted. 
ARTICLE VI 
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 
Sec. 28. [Special privileges forbidden.] 
The Legislature shall not delegate to any special commission, private corpo-
ration or association, any power to make, supervise or interfere with any 
municipal improvement, money, property or effects, whether held in trust or 
otherwise, to levy taxes, to select a capitol site, or to perform any municipal 
functions. 
Compilers Notes. — The 1971 proposed 
amendment to this section by Senate Joint 
Resolution No 11 was repealed and withdrawn 
by Senate Joint Resolution No 1, Laws 1972 
The 1972 amendment was proposed by Sen-
ate Joint Resolution No 1, Laws 1972 and was 
approved at the general election on November 
7, 1972 The amendment transferred to this 
section the matter formerly comprising section 
29 of this Article 
ARTICLE XIII 
KEVENUE AND TAXATION 
Sec. 5. [Local authorities to levy local taxes — Sharing tax 
and revenues by political subdivisions,] 
The Legislature shall not impose taxes for the purpose of any county, city, 
town or other municipal corporation, but may, by law, vest in the corporate 
authorities thereof, respectively, the power to assess and collect taxes for all 
purposes of such corporation. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary con-
tained in this Constitution, political subdivisions may share their tax and 
other revenues with other political subdivisions as provided by statute. 
Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1980, Senate 
Joint Resolution No. €, proposed to amend Ar-
ticle XIII The proposed amendment was sub-
mitted to the electors at the general election in 
1960 and failed to pass because it did not re-
ceive the necessary majority. 
The 1982 amendment was proposed by Sen-
ate Joint Resolution No. 3, Laws 1982 and was 
approved at the general election on November 
2, 1982 to become effective January 1, 1983. 
The amendment added the second sentence. 
Cross-References. — Revenue and appro-
priations limitation, § 59-17-101 et seq. 
Revenue sharing between political subdivi-
sions, § 11-13-16.5. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 11-14-21 (Supp. 1989) 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-8-50 (Supp. 1989) 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-9-30 (1980) 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-9-32 (Supp. 1989) 
CHAPTER 14 
UTAH MUNICIPAL BOND ACT 
1M4-21. Publication of notice, resolution, or other pro-
ceeding — Contest 
(1) If a municipality has one or more newspapers published within its 
boundaries, the governing body of the municipality shall, from time to time, 
designate one of the newspapers as the "official newspaper" for the publica-
tion of all notices required under this chapter. Otherwise, the governing body, 
from .time to time, shall designate a newspaper with general circulation in the 
municipality as the "official newspaper" for the publication of such notices. 
(2) The governing body of any public body may provide for the publication 
of any resolution or other proceeding adopted by it under this chapter in the 
"official newspaper" designated under Subsection (1). 
(3) In case of 8 resolution or other proceeding providing for the issuance of 
bonds, the governing body may, in lieu of publishing the entire resolution or 
other proceeding, publish a notice of bonds to be issued, titled as such, con-
taining: 
(a) the name of the issuer; 
Cb) the purpose of the issue; 
(c) the type of bonds and the maximum principal amount which may be 
issued; 
(d) the maximum number of years over which the bonds may mature; 
(e) the maximum interest rate which the bonds may bear, if any; 
(f) the maximum discount from par, expressed as a percentage of prin-
cipal amount, at which the bonds may be sold; and 
(g) the times and place where a copy of the resolution or other proceed-
ing may be examined, which shall be at an office of the issuer, identified 
in the notice, during regular business hours of the issuer as described in 
the notice and for a period of at least 30 days after the publication of the 
notice. 
(4) For a period of 30 days after the publication any person in interest may 
contest the legality of 6uch resolution or proceeding, any bonds which may be 
authorized by such resolution or proceeding, or any provisions made for the 
security and payment of the bonds. After the 30-day period no person may 
contest the regularity, formality, or legality of such resolution or proceeding 
for any cause. 
History: C. 1953, 1114-21, enacted by L. 
1977, ch. 45, * 7; 1983, ch. S46, * 5; 1987, ch. 
201, * 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1967 amend-
ment, effective March 16, 1987, redesignated 
former Subsections (2) and (3) as present Sub-
sections (3) and (4), added present Subsection 
(2), and made minor changes in phraseology 
and punctuation. 
CHAPTER 8 
METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICTS 
73-8-50. Withdrawal from district. 
Any municipality whose corporate area has become or is a part of any water 
district may withdraw therefrom in the following manner: 
The governing body of any such municipality may submit to the electors 
thereof at any general or special election the proposition of withdrawing from 
any water district incorporated thereunder. Notice of such election shall be 
given in the manner provided in Subsection 73-8-49(2). Such election shall be 
conducted and the returns thereof canvassed in the manner provided by law 
for the conduct of municipal elections in said city. In the event that the major-
ity of the electors voting thereon vote in favor of such withdrawal, the result 
thereof shall be certified by the governing body of such municipality to the 
board of directors of the district. A certificate of the proceedings hereunder 
shall be made by the secretary7 of the district and filed with the lieutenant 
governor, and upon the filing of such certificate the area of the municipality 
so withdrawing shall be excluded from the said water district, and shall no 
longer be a part thereof; provided, however, that the property within the said 
municipality as it shall exist at the time of such exclusion shall continue 
taxable for the purpose of paying said bonded and other indebtedness out-
standing or contracted for, at the time of such exclusion and until such bonded 
or other indebtedness shall have been satisfied. 
History: X- 1935, ch. 110, I 4fr, C. 1*43, substituted lieutenant governor" for "secre-
100-10-50; L. 1984, ch. 68, § 91. tary of state" in the fifth sentence of the second 
Compiler's Notes. — The 1964 amendment paragraph 
CHAPTER 9 
WATER CONSERVANCY ACT 
73-9-30. Petition for exclusion of lands in district — Procedure — 
Court order. The owner or owners in fee of any lands constituting a por-
tion of the district may file with the board a petition praying that such 
lands be excluded and taken from said district. Petitions shall describe the 
lands which the petitioners desire to have excluded. Such petition must be 
acknowledged in the same manner and form as required in case of a con-
veyance of land and be accompanied by a deposit of money sufficient to 
pay all costs of the exclusion proceedings. The secretary of the board shall 
cause a notice of filing of such petition to be published in the county in 
which said lands, or the major portion thereof, are located. The notice shall 
state the filing of such petition, the names of petitioners, descriptions of 
lands mentioned in said petition, and the prayer of said petitioners; and 
it shall notify all persons interested to appear at the office of said board 
at the time named in aaid notice, showing cause in writing, if any they 
have, why said petition should not be granted. The board at the time and 
place mentioned in the notice, or at the time or times at which the hearing 
of said petition may be adjourned, shall proceed to bear the petition and 
all objections thereto, presented, in writing, by any person showing cause 
as aforesaid, why the prayer of the petition should not be granted. The 
filing of such petition shall be deemed and taken as an assent by each and 
all such petitioners to the exclusion from the district of the lands men-
tioned in the petition, or any part thereof. The board, if they deem it not 
for the best interests of the district that the lands mentioned in the peti-
tion, or portion thereof, shall be excluded from the district, shall order that 
said petition be denied; but if they deem it for the best interest of the 
district, that the lands mentioned in the district, or some portion thereof, 
be excluded from the district, and if there are no outstanding bonds of the 
district, then the board may order the lands mentioned in the petition or 
some portion thereof, to be excluded from the district. Provided, further, 
that in case contract has been made between the district and the United 
States or any agency thereof, no change shall be made in the boundaries 
of the district unless the secretary of the interior shall assent thereto in 
writing and such assent be filed with the board. Upon such assent, any 
lands excluded from the district shall upon order of the court be discharged 
from all liens in favor of the United States under the contract with the 
United States or under bonds deposited with its agents. Upon allowance 
of such petition, the board shall file a certified copy of the order of the 
board making such change with the clerk of the court and upon order of 
the court said lands shall be excluded from the district. 
Hiitory: L. 1M1, eh. 99, ISO, C. 1S43, 
100-11-30 
CHAPTER 9 
WATER CONSERVANCY ACT 
73-9-32. Election on issuance of bonds or incurring con-
tract indebtedness or obligation — When re-
quired. 
(1) If the majority of a water conservancy district board approves a resolu-
tion determining that the interests of the district and the public interest or 
necessity demand the acquisition, construction, or completion of any water 
supply, waterworks, improvements, or facilities, or the making of any contract 
with the United States or other persons or corporations, public or private, to 
carry out the purposes of the district, wherein an indebtedness or obligation is 
created, to satisfy which requires an expenditure greater than the ordinary 
annual income and revenue of the district, the board shall adopt a resolution 
directing that an election be held to determine whether bonds shall be issued, 
or an indebtedness or obligation under a contract shall be incurred in the 
amount and for the purposes specified in the resolution. 
(2) The following shall be subject to the conditions provided in Chapter 14, 
Title 11, the Utah Municipal Bond Act: 
(a) adoption of the resolution calling the election; 
(b) giving notice of the election; 
(c) conduct of the election; 
(d) determination of voters' qualifications; and 
(e) canvassing of election results. 
(3) The board may, for purposes of the election: 
(a) treat the entire district as a single precinct or divide the district 
into precincts; and 
(b) fix polling places. 
(4) If bonds or the indebtedness or obligations under a contract are payable 
solely from revenues derived from the operation of the district's works, no 
election is required under this section prior to issuance of the bonds or the 
entering into of the contract, except as provided in Subsection (5). 
(5) No district may issue bonds or incur an indebtedness or obligation un-
der a contract payable solely from revenues unless: 
(a) the issuance of the bonds or the incurring of the contract indebted-
ness or obligation has been approved at an election called and held as 
provided in this section; or 
(b) the board of directors adopts a resolution declaring the intention of 
the district to issue bonds or incur a contract indebtedness or liability 
payable solely from revenues in the amount and for the purpose provided 
in the resolution and directs that notice of this intention be published 
once in a newspaper of general circulation in the district. 
(i) The notice of intention shall set forth: 
(A) the amount and purpose of the proposed bond issue or con-
tract; and 
(B) when and where petitions may be filed requesting the call-
ing of an election to determine whether the bonds may be issued 
or the contract indebtedness or obligation may be incurred. 
(ii) The resolution of the board shall specify the form of the peti-
tions. 
(iii) If, within 60 days after the publication of the notice of inten-
tion, a petition is filed with the secretary of the board, signed by not 
less than 5% of the qualified electors of the district, requesting that 
an election be called to authorize the issuance of the bonds or the 
incurring of the contract indebtedness or liability payable solely from 
revenues, then the board shall proceed to call and hold an election as 
provided in this section. The qualified electors of the district shall be 
certified to the board, prior to the adoption of the resolution, by the 
clerks of the counties in which portions of the district are located. 
(iv) If no petition is filed, or if the number of signatures filed 
History: L. 1941, ch. 99, t 32; C. 1943, 
100-11-32; L. 1977, ch. 282, $ €; 1981, ch. 285, 
I 5; 1985, ch. 190, { 3; 1988, ch. 146, i 2. 
Compiler's Notes. — The 1981 amendment 
inserted the Subsection (1) designation; substi-
tuted "chapter" for "act" in the first sentence of 
Subsection (1); added the last sentence of Sub-
section (1); added Subsection (2); and made 
minor changes in phraseology and punctua-
tion 
The 1985 amendment inserted references to 
contract indebtedness or obligations through-
out the section; inserted "or incurred" in the 
first sentence of Subsection (1); inserted 
"Chapter 14, Title 11" in the second sentence of 
Subsection (1); inserted "or the entering into of 
a contract" in the last sentence of Subsection 
(1), rewrote Subsection (2)(a) which formerly 
read, "No district may issue revenue bonds un-
der this chapter unless"; inserted "or contract" 
near the beginning of Subsection (2)Cb); in-
serted "to the board, prior to the adoption of 
the resolution" in the third sentence of Subsec-
tion (2Kb); substituted "an election" for "a bond 
election on the issuance of the bonds" near the 
end of the third sentence of Subsection (2Kb); 
added "or enter into the contract" at the end of 
the section; and made minor changes in phra-
seology. 
The 1988 amendment, effective April 25, 
1988, divided and redesignated the provisions 
of former Subsection (1) as present Subsections 
(1) to (4); substituted "in Subsection (5)" for "in 
Subsection (2) and in Section 73-9-32.5" at the 
end of Subsection (4); redesignated former Sub-
section (2) as present Subsection (5) and within 
that subsection redesignated former Subsec-
tion (a) as the present introductory paragraph, 
redesignated former Subsections (aHi) and 
(a)fii) as present Subsection (a) and the intro-
ductory paragraph in Subsection (b), and di-
vided former Subsection (b) into present Sub-
aections (bHi) to (iv); and made stylistic 




Walter R. Miller, #2268 
Sandy City Attorney 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
440 East 8680 South 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Telephone: (801) 566-1561 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SANDY CITY, a municipal : 
corporation, and J. STEVEN 
NEWTON, : A M E N D E D 
P l a i n t i f f s , : C O M P L A I N T 
vs. : 
SALT LAKE COUNTY WATER : 
CONSERVANCY DISTRICT, and 
JOHN DOES NOS. 1-10, : Civil No.88-908315 CV 
Defendants. : Judge Raymond S. Uno 
Plaintiffs amend their complaint to allege as follows: 
PARTIES 
1. Plaintiff Sandy City (herein "City") is a municipal 
corporation of the State of Utah, organized under authority of the 
Utah "Optional Forms of Municipal Government Act" (Section 10-3-
12-1 et seq., Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended) and located in 
Salt Lake County, Utah. It is a "municipality" within the meaning 
of 10-1-104, Utah Code Ann. (1953), and may sue in its own name 
under 10-1-20, Utah Code Ann. (1953). Plaintiff Sandy City also 
maintains a Water Department to service water needs of its 
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residents and is a wholesale water customer of the Salt Lake County 
Water Conservancy District (herein "Conservancy District"). 
2. Plaintiff J. Steven Newton (herein ••Newton") is a resident 
and elector within the boundaries of the Defendant and a member of 
the Board of Directors of the Conservancy District. Plaintiff 
Newton also pays real property taxes to the District. Plaintiff 
Newton purchases culinary water from Sandy City which in turn 
purchases the water from the Defendant. 
3. The Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District was 
organized in 1951, purportedly under authority of the Water 
Conservancy Act (73-9-1 et seq., Utah Code Ann. 1953), and is 
located in Salt Lake County, Utah. The Conservancy District 
asserts taxing powers and other jurisdiction over substantially all 
nonexempt real property lying within the territorial boundaries of 
the City. Despite the broad range of asserted Conservancy District 
powers, the nature of Conservancy District organization and 
operations is such that public scrutiny of the District is minimal. 
4. John Does 1-10 are unidentified officials, officers, 
employees, or agents of the named defendants or others who 
participated or are interested in the events that are the subject 
of this action. 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
5. Jurisdiction is proper pursuant to 78-3-4 and 78-33-1, 
Utah Code Ann. (1953), and Rules 65A and 65B of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Venue is properly laid in the Third Judicial 
District Court for Salt Lake County pursuant to 78-13-1, Utah Code 
2 
Ann. (1953) (actions respecting real property), 78-13-3 (actions 
against a conservancy district), and 78-13-7 (all other actions). 
In addition, the District Court has general oversight and equity 
jurisdiction over Conservancy Districts under Section 73-9-1 et 
seq.f Utah Code Ann. (1953) (Water Conservancy Act). 
SUBJECT REAL PROPERTY
 % 
6. Real property lying within the territorial boundaries of 
the City consists of approximately 19.4 square miles, between 
approximately 7800 South and 12200 South, and 700 West and 3000 
East, in Salt Lake County. 
7. The Conservancy District asserts jurisdiction over the 
majority of territory within Sandy City boundaries pursuant to its 
original establishment and subsequent annexations of territory. 
ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY 
8. The Conservancy District was organized in 1951 to provide 
water for municipal and industrial use within Salt Lake County 
outside the Salt Lake City service area. A copy of the court 
decree establishing the district is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" 
and is made a part hereof by reference. 
9. Since organization of the Conservancy District, District 
officials have periodically sought to extend District boundaries 
in order to expand its tax base and service delivery area. A 
number of such expansions purport to encompass territory within 
Sandy City. 
10. Conservancy District officials have also periodically 
sponsored judicial approval of disconnection from the District. 
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The following incidents of disconnection are among those which have 
removed territory from within District Boundaries: 
a. Territory lying in the East Millcreek and Cottonwood 
Heights area (District Court Order of Exclusion entered Nover±>er 
1, 1979). 
b. Subdivision located in Township 4 South, Range 2 
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian (District Court order entered 
January 13, 1988)• 
c. Properties once owned by Dixie Six Corporation, 
Callrex Inc., Concepts Inc., Salt Lake County, John E. Roberts, 
Romeo L. Vellatin and Barker Brothers (District Court Order of 
Exclusion entered November 8, 1978). 
11. Conservancy District officials have periodically 
authorized and/or incurred indebtedness, including bonded 
indebtedness in excess of $41 million, under authority of a 
resolution providing for the issuance of Water Conservancy District 
Revenue Bonds, adopted February 6, 1987. Section 6.19 of that 
resolution provides as follows: 
Lew of Tax to Pay Operation and Maintenance Costs. The 
Issuer shall, so long as any of the Bonds or Contracts 
are Outstanding, levy annually the tax of .0004 on the 
dollar, or the maximum amount of such different annual 
levy as may be hereafter provided for by law, of assessed 
valuation of taxable property within the Issuer or so 
much thereof as shall be necessary, for payment of 
Operation and Maintenance Costs pursuant to the 
provisions of Section 73-9-16, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
as amended. 
12. Conservancy District officials have levied taxes and 
established fees to service indebtedness and to provide services 
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to customers assertedly within its boundaries. District officials 
have also refrained from levying taxes and collecting fees from 
properties disconnected from the District. 
13. Since initial inclusion of Sandy City in the Conservancy 
District in 1951, the City has experienced dramatic growth and 
development. Sandy is now known nationally as having one of the 
fastest growing populations in the Country. Such growth is 
projected to continue at a rapid rate into the twentieth century. 
14. City officials believe that the capacity and willingness 
of the Conservancy District to service this growth and provide firm 
water commitments to the City and its residents at reasonable rates 
is strictly limited and that the rapid growth of the City will soon 
require water resource capacities at economical rates which the 
Conservancy District cannot or will not provide. 
15. City officials believe, pursuant to extensive study and 
investigation, that firm water resources are available to the City 
and its residents, at reasonable rates, through the Metropolitan 
Water District of Salt Lake City (herein "Metropolitan District11). 
In order to secure firm water resource commitments, the City has 
applied to the controller of the Metropolitan Water District for 
a statement preliminary to annexation to that District, as required 
by Utah Code Ann. 73-8-49(2). A copy of City Council Resolution 
88-34 C, authorizing such application, is attached hereto as 
Exhibit f,B." 
16. On May 17 , 1988 the Sandy City Council adopted 
Resolution 88-40 C, applying to the Board of Directors of the 
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Metropolitan District for consent to annex the City to that 
District, and requested that the Board of Directors grant such 
application subject to such terms and conditions as may be fixed. 
A copy of that Resolution is attached hereto as Exhibit ,,C." 
17. On about January 9, 1989f the Metropolitan Water District 
replied by Resolution to the Cityfs application, setting the terms 
and conditions of annexation as required by statute, which terms 
and conditions are acceptable to the City. 
18. On October 18, 1988, under authority of City Council 
Resolution #88-84 C, the City set a special election to be held in 
Sandy City on February 7, 1989, to determine by a majority vote of 
the registered voters voting in the election whether or not to 
annex property within Sandy City to the Metropolitan Water District 
of Salt Lake City, subject to such terms and conditions as have 
been fixed. 
19. Concurrent with its application for annexation to the 
Metropolitan Water District, the City has requested disconnection 
of property within Sandy City from the Conservancy District, in 
order to minimize unfair financial burdens on the City or its 
residents. The City also proposed the setting of reasonable terms 
and conditions for disconnection of such property from the 
Conservancy District. 
20. On November 17# 1988, the Conservancy District Board of 
Directors denied the Cityfs request for disconnection (District 
officials have subsequently informed City representatives that the 
District will not consider disconnection of the City under any 
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conditions). Instead, the Conservancy District Board of Directors 
adopted a supplemental resolution approving additional bonded 
indebtedness, up to $26.5 million, to finance the following: 
Projects Defendants1 Estimated rn^t 
a. Acquisition of water rights -
Utah Lake and Welby Jacob $12,500,000 
b. Jordan Narrows Pump Station 5,187,000 
c. Construction of District Headquarters 
Complex equipment and furnishings 4,761,000 
d. Addition and improvements to the 
water transmission distribution 
systems and related well modifications 658,000 
e. Estimated preliminary and incidental 
expenses, costs of insurance, 
necessary repairs and contingencies 3,394,000 
21. On December 15, 1988, the District Board of Directors 
excluded the District Headquarters Complex from the bond 
authorization and reduced the amount of the proposed bonds to not 
exceed $23 million. The District did not, however, amend its 
resolution or notice previously adopted authorizing bonding. The 
effect of such removal will be to exclude the decisions relating 
to the building from the public petition and election process 
provided for in Utah Code Ann. 73-9-32. 
FIRST BASIS FOR RELIEF 
22. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege paragraphs 1 through 21 
above. 
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23. The elected officials of the City support annexation to 
the Metropolitan Water District and Plaintiff Newton duly believes 
that a majority of registered voters within Sandy will likewise 
favor such annexation. 
24. If annexation is approved by election, the City will 
commence to derive its water from the Metropolitan Water District, 
pursuant to the terms and conditions of annexation, except for 
continuation of ongoing water purchase agreements with the 
Conservancy District. Sandy City will not otherwise be served by 
the Conservancy District, and will have no reasonable prospect of 
being served in the foreseeable future. 
25. Because City lands will not be serviced by the 
Conservancy District, any benefits contemplated to accrue by 
inclusion within the boundaries of the Conservancy District by 
residents and property owners within Sandy will cease. 
26. The refusal of the Conservancy District to permit 
disconnection of the City from the District was based upon an 
erroneous perception of the best interests of the District and 
failed to consider the needs and interest of lands and persons 
within Sandy City. 
26. If annexation to the Metropolitan Water District is 
approved, lands within the City should be excluded from the 
Conservancy District and no longer be subject to the burdens of 
taxation and additional indebtedness by the District inasmuch as 
benefits of inclusion within the Conservancy District will not be 
forthcoming. 
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27. Utah Code Ann. 73-8-50, permits the City to withdraw from 
any water district within its corporate area as follows: 
Any municipality whose corporate area has become or 
is a part of any water district may withdraw therefrom 
in the following manner: 
The governing body of any such municipality may 
submit to the electors thereof at any general or special 
election the proposition of withdrawing from any water 
district incorporated thereunder. Notice of such 
election shall be given in the manner provided in 
subdivision (b) of section 73-8-49 [posting or 
publication] hereof. Such election shall be conducted 
and the returns thereof canvassed in the manner provided 
by law for the conduct of municipal elections in said 
city. In the event that the majority of the electors 
voting thereon vote in favor of such withdrawal, the 
result thereof shall be certified by the governing body 
of such municipality to the board of directors of the 
district. A certificate of the proceedings hereunder 
shall be made by the secretary of the district and filed 
with the secretary of state, and upon the filing of such 
certificate the area of the municipality so withdrawing 
shall be excluded from the said water district, and shall 
no longer be a part thereof; provided, however, that the 
property within the said municipality as it shall exist 
at the time of such exclusion shall continue taxable for 
the purpose of paying said bonded and other indebtedness 
outstanding or contracted for, at the time of such 
exclusion and until such bonded or other indebtedness 
shall have been satisfied. 
28. City officials desire to place the issue of disconnection 
from the Conservancy District before the Sandy City electorate, so 
that the public may be heard. In order to maximize informed 
decisions by such voters, on disconnection from the Conservancy 
District as well as on annexation to the Metropolitan District, the 
City requests a declaratory ruling by the Court as to what portion 
of District indebtedness is taxable upon properties in the City, 
upon disconnection, within the meaning of the foregoing statute. 
29. In the alternative, should an election on the issue of 
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disconnection be determined to be impractical or otherwise, the 
City requests the Court to exercise its oversight jurisdiction in 
equity to approve disconnection of the City from the Conservancy 
District, for the reasons set forth above, and to determine the 
reasonable terms and conditions upon which such disconnection 
should occur. 
SECOND BASIS FOR RELIEF 
30. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 through 29 above. 
31. Plaintiff Newton is a member of the Districts Board of 
Directors and an elector of the District and is required to 
determine tax rates and persons upon whom taxes are to be imposed. 
Such plaintiff questions the constitutional authority of the non-
elected members of the District's Board to levy taxes and seeks a 
Declaratory Judgment as to the District's tax powers. Further, an 
informed decision by the Sandy City electorate, on the issues of 
annexation and/or disconnection, require a determination of taxable 
obligations of lands within the City to the Conservancy District. 
32. Taxation is a legislative function which can be 
constitutionally delegated to the elected officials of counties, 
cities and towns under Article XIII, Section 5 of the Utah 
Constitution or special districts authorized by such elected 
officials; however, Conservancy District officials are not elected 
and the District does not constitute a county, city or town or a 
district authorized thereby. 
33. Plaintiffs believe that an informed decision by the 
electorate will require a determination as to whether the 
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Conservancy District has power to impose taxes and designate those 
who are to pay the same, in light of the following provisions of 
the Utah Constitution: 
(1) Article VI, Section 28, which states that w[T]he 
legislature shall not delegate to any special commission, 
private corporation or association, any power to make, 
supervise or interfere with any municipal improvement, 
money, property or effects, whether held in trust or 
otherwise, to levy taxes, to select a capital site, or 
perform any municipal functions." 
(2) Article V, Section 1, which effectively vests the 
power of taxation in the legislative branch of 
government. 
34. Based upon the foregoing, plaintiffs request a 
A 
declaratory ruling from the Court as to whether the Conservancy 
District has power to impose taxes and designate the persons to pay 
the same. Plaintiff Newton also seeks a determination as to 
whether the resolution providing for the issuance of Water 
Conservancy District Revenue Bonds, adopted February 6, 1987 
(quoted in paragraph 11 above), directly or indirectly bind the 
District or its Board members to set fees or levy taxes at the 
maximum rate, contrary to their lawful authority, or constitute 
general obligations of the District so as to require an election. 
35. Plaintiffs also request a ruling permitting the 
Conservancy District to issue the bonds described in Paragraphs 2 0 
and 21 above, without obligating properties lying within the 
11 
boundaries of Sandy City. 
THIRP PASJS FOR FE1IEF 
36. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 through 35 above. 
37. Plaintiffs allege# upon information and belief, that the 
bonds referred to in paragraphs 20 and 21 above, were authorized 
in the absence of clear and accurate information reasonably 
calculated to actually inform the public of such bonds or their 
likely impact, or the notice required by Utah Code Ann. 73-9-2 (to 
be read in conjunction with Utah Code Ann. 11-14-21 and 73-9-32). 
38. Failure to reasonably inform the public will prejudice 
their due process right to petition in opposition to such bonding 
or to otherwise be heard. 
39. Because of inadequate notice, persons within the District 
are not able to respond to the District's bonding proposals. 
Plaintiffs are uniquely in a position to bring this issue before 
the court for determination, and request a declaratory ruling on 
the adequacy of notice of bonding. 
FOURTH BASIS FOR RELIEF 
40. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 through 39. 
41. The Conservancy District is in the process of 
construction of a new District Headquarters Complex which, if 
completed, will far exceed the current needs of the District or its 
future needs for decades to come, even if the disconnection of City 
lands does not occur. 
42. Plaintiffs state, on information and belief, that costs 
of construction are to be paid from funds derived from City area 
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tax revenues and that the construction project and sale of existing 
facilities were not adequately presented to the public for review. 
43. Plaintiffs request that the Court extend its equity 
jurisdiction to approve an initiative form and procedure by which 
the construction of the new District Headquarters Complex and the 
sale of existing facilities, and other issues relating to the 
District, can be reasonably and effectively presented to the public 
for consideration. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray that the Court issue the following: 
1. A declaratory judgment as to the issues set forth in 
Paragraphs 28 and 29 above. 
2. A declaratory judgment as to the issues set forth in 
Paragraphs 34 and 35 above. 
3. A declaratory judgment as to the issues set forth in 
Paragraph 39 above. 
4. A declaratory judgment as to the issues set forth in 
Paragraph 43 above. 
5. For injunctive relief, should the court determine that 
an injunction is necessary to grant effective relief to plaintiffs 
on any or all of the foregoing. 
DATED this y ^ ^ a y of January, 1989. 
WALTER R. KILLER 
Sandy City Attorney 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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in TITS uxstaicr occ.tr or T I E T R U E JVZZCUL uoTiac? 
zx kui roa SALT u&x cororr 
STATE 0 ? UTAH 
oojoa 
J* THE lUTTfR Of THS OHCKUXUTIOI I 
u* TH£ SilT UKC CJUHTI UTCA COI-
oUtYAucr uxsTaic? pufvSUAKT TO o u r r a i n e f t c x 
H, TITIX ioo, UTAH co:* AUttuns, 
l ? i j f AS AU£KUD. . I 
Thia amiuir hawing oaaa ac rafulaxl/ for hoaring bafera tbt abcra aatitlad 
oourt with tha Honoraoia CXaraaot S« Dakar* Judga than of, p rati dine en tha 
Kith day of Saptaabar, USl, on tha patitlon of Yoriaua av&ara of land within 
tho propotsd Coroonrancy tiatriat far tba oraatlen and organisation of a UUr 
Coajaranoy l ittrict, and notloa of tha tiaa, placa and natura af aald haarlng 
having baon given in tba aannar and far tba tiaa praaoribod by law, and tha 
court having hoard tha awidanoa adiacod and barlag axaainad al l of tha rwcorda 
and fUti in tali prooaadinc and bal&g ful l / adfiaod in tba prasifltt, and baring 
a&tartd ita lindln^a of Faet and Conol&alona af taa, 
«V», TJCfiVjUS, IT IS OHCU1D, AWI&Q2X AH3 XMHED AS WlL^Si 
1* Tha ltgtl notioa af tba pandaney af thia patition hat Uia giwan at 
raquind by lav and by tba ontar of tbia aaurt. 
2. That tha patitioo la in al l rtwpmtU in prcptr for» and aitfsad by tha 
i 
ra^iiiita rwbar of quallflad algnaiv* 
}• Tnat tha tarrltory bartinaftar dtaeribad ahouXd bt and tha aa»a ia 
haraby organiiad, oonatitatad, and oraatad a MUr Conatrranoy i*»triei undar 
tha laaa of tha »UU of Utah and that oalt district aball ba htr*tn*ftor 
known as "Tha Salt Lata Count/ tatar Conaaranoy Hotriet- with ita offie§ or 
prinelpil plaea of buinaaa in Salt Uta County, Stata of Utah. Thtt Urn 
pr©r*rty lnoluJad within Uai diftriat ia datoribod a» followat 
Cwmonclnn at tha douthvaat Cornar of faction 17, Tomshlp 2 Scjth, 
fUn-o 1 *est, SU&U (tha lotaraaotlon of 6200 :'«uth i>traat and 1000 
•tit .>trvot}| and running thaaoa •aat 2 allct, sort or lt*t, alor^ tba 
aaotion lin«s to tha i>outb»tit oornar of oeotlon 13, TOTOPUP 2 South, 
rjn^t 2 w#fitt MULU (tba intaratetUn or 6200 South £tr*#t and SOOO 
»*a«t strait)| thtaoa north 2 ailM, nor* or las*, alor^ th* *tction 
linoi to tha i;outhaMt cornar of faction 2, Tomjnip 2 Jouth. Ita not 
2 tost, (tha lntarawotion ol 1*700 ^outh and £600 «ait ^tr»tt)) thonot 
ftatt two a l lo t , i o n or last , alaa* tha a action l int t to tha South-
aatt coraar of faction } t Toanahlp 2 South, Kaagt 2 loat, a.L.D.iy. (tbt inttrttct ioo of 1.700 So\ith tad 7200 *aat)| tbaaoa borta L I U M , 
• o n or lata, along tha aaotiaa linaa to tha bouthoaat aaraar of 
Saotion 15, To*rani? 1 3vulh, fta&ft 2 *aat (tha latartaoUdon of 2100 
South atraat and ??00 laat Straat)l tbaaoa £aat % a l lot tad 753 Xatt, 
aora or laat, to tba bo\»dary of Salt Ukt City, which la 763 f t t t 
laat of tha touthaaii coraar of Saetiaa 16, Toaaabip 1 South, flan*a 
1 i a t t , S.L.0.£*.jL/thaaoa Xalloaia* tho bouadary of Salt Ukt City 
(aaoludin* a l l of 5 t i t Uki Clt/ and a l l of South Salt Lakt, at tha/ 
prattntly a i la t , tharafro*) at folio*tt South aloqc tbt boundary 
of Salt Lakt City 103 Xaati tbaaoa float 10,7L7 Xaat, wcr% or l taa, 
to tha *att bank of tha Jordan Airar, tbt oca Kortbarly aloof tha 
•ott bank of tht Jordan Klrar to a point 19Lii*32 Xaat 9aat aod 33*3 
ft i t iiovth of a conusant at 6th aaat and 17th South dtraatj thtnot 
Laat along tht :*outb boundary of Salt Ukt City, ahieh ia a low; tha 
^ouU aida of 17th South otraat 2350 Xaatj tbaaoa Sorih 635*3 Xa*t| 
thanoa Saot 330 Xatt} tbaaoa aorth 2101.2 Xatt, to a point on tho 
ifcuth aida of 13th bouth Straat, aald point baing 6.32 faat Mat 
and 16.16 fatt South of tha aonuaaat at 7th *aat aad 13th South 
Streattj thonca i+tt alont tbt South, iida oX 13th :<outh Strttt 
1502*6 Xatt to tha eaatar oX Block 6, f lvt Aora f lat S, Bit Xltld 
Survoyj thonco .'fetth 2671 fatt , to a point oa tht north aida oX t* • 
17th ftouth .'/troatt tlwnoa £aat 762*62 Xatt to a point oa tbt laat j ^ 
aida of Lth !>©st straatj tboao© Korth 2571 Xa*rt_ioit point _©a Aba * 
ecutb aida of 13th South Stravt; tbaaoa Salt £05J&roaVto tha 
Saat aldo o: Third »aot| thanoa ilouth aloaa tbt «aat aida of Third 
"*o«t i>troat 17303"Xoot| tbaaoa Laat 33 Xaat to tha oaatar of Third 
*aat otrattf thaaoa tfouth alone tha oantar liaa of Third taat Strtt t 
1501.$ foat to a poiet 251*1 Xaat South of tha South aida of 17th 
South Jtratt, aald poiat balsa 75? Xaat Mat of tha-Mat aidt of 
Saoond Mat -tract; thtaoa £aat 759 Xaat to tbt taat aida of Saooad 
aaat Strottj thonca aouth alone tba *ttt t idt of*Stooad taat Strtt t 
2652.1* f t t t , to tba South aida oX 21a% South Strttt , to tba boundary 
of South St l t Ukt) thtooa - t i t alone tha South aida of 21at South 
Strttt to a point 150 faat Mat of tha Vast tidt of 3*oond Saat 
'•tratt) thtnet South to a point la tba oantar aX KLHoraaa Strata 
and 150 Xatt »att of tha Mai tidt of Saoond Mat Straatf thtnet 
Uatarly aloo* tha aaatar oX aaid fcUlorttk Strata to a point of 
lntaratotign of tha aaatar aX aald atraaa aith tat ctnttr of Third. 
T^tt Mrwttil thenet dut fatt to tht oantar of 5th *>t*% fatr»tti tbanca 
»ortn along tht ctnter of 5th Lttt 5Lrtat 14tf.3 ftnt. aore or l ea i i 
thenct Korth 69°50l / a i t l»e f t t t t thonot Horth Q°12* Rttt LIS.9 
Xoott thtnet >.oath ^ 5 0 * Sott LP Xatti thtnoa »orth O0!^1 iatt 
CnT9rToeti thtnet North 6^51'' batt 05 fa<t| thtnoo Xorth C 0 ^ 1 
iatt^l$6 font to tht boundary of ^alt U a t C l t j i thtnot tlong tha 
_Sojlh boundary of Salt Ltkt iiVy Ut% 555*5 Xattt thanot horXh 
167*1 f t t t t thonct *>ttt 2LP.5 Xaatt tfrianca Hprth 25L.1 ftoti thtnea 
faat 9?97Tfoot to tho <ttt f»idt cf 7th ratt btrtttt thtnet ^orth 
Cia.lt ff«t ^ o n < tha *att aLda of 7th tatt ^txatt> thtnoa U t t 3?6 
'Jrtetj"TnuncM ^urnryS^reoti thanoa iJ>at i^y Tcoti thonct ^outh 
^317*05 fc»t) tKunco ^ttt L2$ foot to tha laat _aida of yth U t t _ . 
^tront, boiC: UiflTSaat l int of l e t 5* dYoolTgBa T'tn Acra Flit i # 
.Mr rlold urvo71 t^ »aneo }JV iU\ 11LQ*L Xatt alojg tivt U t t tida of 
f th_aat : t r i^t | thtnoa"fttYt 300'"footi thonct'Sorth, 230.77" fottl_L 
thvnco :*\*% LS9 Xatt; thtnea Uorth 123L*53 Xoott to tht horth* 
att t cornur of Lot £• J'loc* 2d, Ton ^oro flat A, glFHald^ ' 
.'iurvtyi t^i>ca_«^»t^k6?6.^J_Xttt to a &olni ^>22 lomt M i t o f 
tha (Att t lgt of t.'l/.hltnd -rlvt. aald potnt"b*iin|* 'larth 1 W ^ 
•aft, T^A ^^ froe a county tanu—pti thanp &o«)th i S ^ l 1 
tatt 7y«59 ft>t alone t l int parallal to and V.22 f t t t »ott oX 
iha .^it Ho* of )itgniand J l v t . to a ^\^ ^ f . | t *ri*^ »f tha 
North t idt of 3Qth Loath gUtntt thtnet *vait 2557.01 faat alans a 
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lirrt ptrmlltl to , tnd 33 f t t t Sguth of tht Korth ildt of 30th 
South 3tf»at, to i point 9 f t t t f.ttt of tht »ttt tl^T^f Lsstri l l 
Ur»«t and thanct »ortft 1I'>7^7 ftrt alone • l int parellal to and 
9 f t t t Liat of tht Mat t idt of laptri t l Otrttti thanot ^ t j 
3J5?.776 fttt to tht /4iv Una o£ jitlbcumt Jtrtali thanct Srath 
L1L.1S1 faat tlcnr tha ^ t t l U i ol Mtioourna ^ r t U r ^ t n c J — " 
rati ISOO.hl fact to t point 9 f t t t £*tt of tht t t i t llr.t ef 
20tb_Utt otrttti tnt-soa fc'orth 
1Q and 9 ft^t Hatt of tht »ta 
b 1U7«?3 f t t t fclofttf * lift! pondlal... 
t aid* of 23th u t t fitrttii tliai>o+ 
h LP fattl tfranpt Lilt 2TTt~37 r^-,, . Latt S2fc.73 fteti thtnct *ortb Q fottt tha oiL 
.tbaaot G*uih 122.13 f t t t to • qanrttr corntr oatwop to StQtisrj 22 
and 27# ToyntMp 1 fcouth, tengt l U t t , S.L.S,^.t thtnot Uat 
^^^I7l^ftp^.ioj>ht^>fi^ibSeM; wn»r of **43 ballon 22; ttanco, J 
latTln^ t>o boundary of Salt U l t City, I*tt 1 ullo, port or l t t t , 
along tho tootlon linoa to the ^outhoajt corr.tr cf ^ootlon 23. 
Tgraahl? 1 'J»j»hr :AA7O 1 r^ati tbtnoe 5outb 3 allot* aort or lota , 
mleng tht apotlon Imat to the licmthotot corner of '«Otloo 2« TCTT>-
• M I 2 Va-jth. .'.-.n-u 1 :^atr 5.L.3.UM thamaa *t*t O&t a l i a , tcrt 
•^r.laaa, to tht Uat bank of tht Upptr Calais th^n^o N^rt^gitariy 
• loss tho ia t t Unk of tbt Vpotr Canal 2t niltai cert or !•*«, <•* • 
tht.To k rttrr NTH Pf k l i l fr***- lhanca »taiarlr alr .^g 1*t tiartfr fc*n* pf> W!M Cm* tg tht ca.ntar ff HifffOind grlvti thtnot Southa*tUrly 
a along tht ctntor of Highland DrlTt to tbt otnttr of tht lnttrttrUoa 
01 Highland Lrlra ana, jt600 South Strttt i thtttct *Mt along tha ' 
•/rsntrx Ur,i of r:fcg .wo^ tfa Ptrtal to. tho otnur or tba iaur»ac-.ica 
of £600 South 5tr»«t *o4 9tb Ua% t t r t t t In Static* 1?, T emu nip 
2. lioutb, Kanxt 1 U t t , 3»L«Br4at*| tbacnoa Ao«th aiea^ 1M oasUr cT 
9th Uc% Strttt to tbt i^at«ttrt oosttr l id t of itrtioo 20, Townatlp 
2 »outb# rtanf.t 1 Zaat, 5.I.«B*4tr«| thaaot £art alone **^ C u t ^ m 
otnttr l in t of &*otld& 20 U tbt »tat l ino oX dtttloo 21, ?ow&snip 
2 South, /fcnea 1 Saat, 6«L«B«4W.} thanoo Ccuth to tho tout tart at 
-ooroar of - t c t i « j 2I9 Torn*hip 2 South, Aa& t^ 1 £ajt, 3*L«B«tJ<.? 
tbaset latt 2 •Hat , fcora or laaj , olcac tha ataUm 11nat to tba 
r*uUit&at oornar of r*««tlon 22, Toamtni? 2 JouLh, Ki^t 1 £aat 
(tba mttratotioo oX 700Q South uad 2700 Uat Strttt)} tbtaoo 
^^l^duth It a l l ta , aort or Xaaa, aiozyj tba aootlfta linta to tho £>catboajt 
oorotr of Stctioo 10, Tovaanip J South, !Uo*t 1 Uat) thaaot 4aat 
2 al lea, Dora or Icoa, alcv*4 tbt atotioa liaaa^to tbt ^oatl^ajt carntr 
* of Motion 8, ttjvnabip ) 5cutbt Im&t 1 afi*Jt| thtoet South 2 s i i a j , 
mora or l t»ak along tbt t^otloa l l n t i to tba ficuthaMt coraar oi 
• ^ U c t i o a 20, Toiruhip 3 Couth, te&co 1 Z&at] tbo&ot Salt 2 & U M , aaro 
^ o f loao, alone tht toot ion llnoo to tbt SouU^oit eonar of Station 19$ 
^Tevnahlp 3 Ccmth^ Raj^t 1 Cut) tht&oo South J i alloa, aort or laaa, 
Alone tha Salt i*ka liarULUn llna to tba *aat qoartar ooraar of ^actios 
7, Tovnabip L fi^uth, £*n£t 1 i u t | fi.L.DXii.j tbfinca Sort 5 Allot , aoro 
— or lata, to tht ^aat Outrtor ooraor of Socrtiaa 7# Tovnablp U Sovtb, 
/iw^a 1 feaatf tha not liortb 10 i all**, aero or lata, aloa^ tbt taction 
linta to tht Scruthatat coraar of Sootioa 17, Tos&abip 2 3omtb, lUn^i 
1 Mat, thloh i t tbt point of btginningf including i s aaid diatriot 
411 o-Ttht Ur ritory I O A U of tbt o i tUa oad t e r o oitbia at id tiatoribod 
dlatriot, ottopt tha a i t j of ttoragr* 
aw That tHo Board of Siroeton of tald dlatriot a h i l l oonala t of nina 
dlraotora and tha torrltory v l t h U aald dlatriot lo btrtby oubdijldad Into 
rdruj dlTltiona and aach dlTiaio^harainaftar daacrlbad anall bo ontitlad to 
ana diroetor* That tha aina diritioaa art ot fo l lo i t i 
U ) i lr ialon ho. I to bt known at tho QrtngaiMtmttr llviaton. 
CotBonolng at tht Kouthaaat coraar of feootton 3 t Tovathip 7 iouth, 
^n«a 2 »t t t , b.L.24^.1 (tha intanaetioa of l?00 South asd 72X 
laat)) and runniai; tbt&ot north alon^ tha atotioa linoa and alor^ tha 
*t t t l in t of Urn Coaaarraaor Uatr ie t L a l l a l , aort or laaa, to 
tht .'.outhvtat comer of loetloa 15, Tuvnahip 1 £outb, RAW 2 ^tat, 
- t -
(tht inttrttotion of 7200 *ttt and 2100 South) | thtnot tast tier* 
ths ttotion Un*t anu aloaj tha north 11M of the Cuastrvtncy *ittrlet 
5 Bilti *nd 703 feet, aort or lees, to tho bouodtry or Stlt L&kt City, 
•hich it ?fi3 fstt eaat of the Jouthwttt aorner of Section 16, Tewnanip 
1 youth, rten*t I *est| theaoa eouth along tht bounxkry of Salt Ukt 
City and of tht Conternnoy fciatrict 103 faet| thtnes east 10,7147 
feet, u n or less, to tht tsit bank of tho Jordan Ai?er| theace eoutberly 
t-loru tht vtft bank of tht Jordan iliTtr to tho junction of tht tttt 
bant of tht Jordan Altar alth tht Berth asction lint of Ststlen 2, 
Township 3 South, **&£• 1 SestJ tht not t t t t aiorva tht Stotlon lints 
to tht Herthtttt oornsr of asetioa u, Township 2 3©uth, :*aa4t 1 *t»t) 
thtnot touth tlon* tht ttetiun lint to tht Ssuthastt eoratr of stid 
isctton Lf thenoe oast along tht ttotion lines 5 atlas, aaro or 
loss, to pltct or boglnnlnct 
M LlTiolon Ho. 2 to bt known at tho loot Jordan Slrislon. 
Coaaoncinc at tht Southstst corner of Section 5, Tutnsblp 3 South, 
Juinrjs l Jott, S*L.9«&U«f oo tht t u t Una of tho ConstnrAnoy ilstriet (I.0CO tost) &n& running thoncc north alone tht vttt boundary lint of 
tto CorujQrvAiw/ ^irtrioi and on tht aaotlna Unas 1* alias, aort or 
lues, to tho Horthaeet eomor of Ssetinn 20, Township 2 South, JUn^ e 
1 >*est (1*000 f'Ott a&J 6200 fccuth)) thtnot vest along tht Conasronoy 
Cistrict bounuVir/ lint and along tbo section lintt 2 alias, aort or 
lots, to tht wouttosst torntr of Section 13* Township 2 South, K*n*i 
2 ' t i t (6200 South and 5600 *sst)j thtnot north alone tbo Conatrvtncy 
District boundary and tht ttotion lines 2 allot, aort or lots, to tha 
Uouthtast oomer of ttotion 2, Township 2 South, Hangs 2 tost (17X 
South tad 5600 *>eet) thsnet oast along tht ttotion linut aad tht south 
lint of Mrltioa Ho• 1 to tht Soutbvwst corntr of Ssetioa Ut Tutnsnip 2 
South, Ksn<s 1 *tsti than north 1 milt, aort or loss, alone ths stetioa 
Una and ths tatt lint of division No* 1 to tht Acrthwsst torntr of 
Stotion L, Township 2 South, £a&£t 1 £eefc, Thtnot tast tlo*w tha south 
lint of ilvlsiun Ro. 1 aaJ alone tht ttotion lint a to tha tost bank 
of tha Jordan < lvar j tht DO s south alone tha t t t t bans of tht «/©ru*n 
Mvnr to a point duo vast of Murray City's north boundary lint ntir 
tht tast lint of faction 2, Township 2 South, Kangc 1 tttt , S.l.&»UU) 
thtnot fast to ths Kest bank of tha Jordan fiivwrj thanot Sooth along 
tht Hatt bank of tht Jordan Kirer to U» junction thartof altb tho 
aouthtrly lint of Stotion 2, Township 3 Se-uth, lan^t 1 «tst) thsnet wtst 
alon^ tho ttctlon lintt 3i sdlsi, aort or lass, to plaot gf bsgin&inf # 
.. .^ 
(o) Pirition no, 3 to bo known at tha Couth Jordan Diriaion. 
Coastoncinc at tho junction of tha aoutham boundary of tha 
Conservancy Ms triot and tho teat bank of tha Jordan Alvsr In Motion 
10, Tovrtship l South, i'±n& ^ ^ottj and rannlnc thanot tost alone 
tto <;utrier section linus and alon^ tho oouth boundary of tho ContsrT*ncy 
(istrict 2) riUcS| con or last, to tht oast quarter cormr of faction 
7, Tcwrvhip u 'outh, r^ n^ a 1 atat) thanot north aionj tha »»et line 
of tWb Conasrranoy iistriet and alon^ tht ttotion linot 6 | ailtt, 
»ort or l tss , to ths *'orthvost oor&tr of- Soetioo 6, Tosnship 3 routh, 
Xan.:s 1 ftst) thtnot Lstt alone tha ttctlon linvt anJ altn^ tht toath 
baunisj-y of -ivltion Ho. 3 t 3i ai l ts , wort 04' I t t i , to tht vtst btnk 
of tht Jordan *ivtr| thanot toutharly aloa^ tha atat bank of the Jordan 
flivtr 6J nil'a, acta or l tss , to tht plaot of bt£innlne« 
(d) * lvition »io. I to pa known at *idvalt City ^ivltion. 
All of thr area ineludad within tho ineorporatad Units of kidrslt 
City aa thtr preeanUy taiat* 
• $ -
(•) Dirition »o. $ to bo known to dtad/ City Uvl t lon. 
All of tht trot includtd t l t b U tho incorporated limit• of 3ax>dy 
City to tho/ rrettntly oxitt* 
(f) llTioion KO. 6 to bo JUMPVO ae Oranito Fmrk Diriilon. . 
Coeawtneinc t t tht junction of tho voot bank of tho Jordan ilvor 
tnd tht Conttrttney Uittriet boundtry in tht florthwttt qwu-fctr of 
aeetion 23, Townanip 1 South, Range 1 *aotf &«2.«U*AJ(»| tbtnee northtrly 
alon^ tho ContorYtncy Cittrict bounoary on tht oott bank of tht Jordan 
hirer to t point l?Jibt32 foot oott and 33 f#ot touth of t aonrua«nt 
ot 630 *ont nn>l 1700 ^outh otroeta) thonoo following along tho northerly 
boundary of t.fct Conterrancy Dittriot to tho junction of Mid Constrrtncj 
l i e i r i c t boundary and tho con tor linn of 900 **tt ^t root J thaneo ^outb 
along tho center l ino of 900 J-att *trott to tht Juration of 900 La at 
Jitroot tnd tho northerly boundary of itirray City) thonoo votttrly 
Along tho northerly boundary of Hurray City t t i t OJV oxiatt , to tho weft 
ban* of tho Jonian Kivtr near tho owat l ino of lit ot ion 2, Townahip 2 
South, Han\:e 1 *wtt, 3.L.B#4*.| thonoo northorly Along tho wtat bank 
of tho Jordan Kivmr to tht pltoo of bog inning • 
(g) Division :k>. 7 to bo known AO tat t m i l Crook Clrloiofu 
i l l of tho Conterraney Diftriot OAtt of tho oonttr lino of 900 
Lttt Streot tnd north of tht cantor lino of $600 South Strott olden 
otid division i t sort particularly detorlbed At followti 
Comeneing ot tht junction of tht north boundary lino of tho Con* 
eemncy t i t t r io t end tht center l in t of 900 £*tt Strttt tnd runninx thence 
oott alonjj tht northerly boundary l in t of tho Conttrttncy Liatrict to 
tho joutheaet eomtr of fceotion 231 Townthip 1 South, &ange 1 £att , 
3.l»**kU*$ thtnet touth Along tht Contenrtncy Llatrict boundary 3 a i l e t , 
sort or l t t t , to tho South**ft cornor of S action 2* Townthip 2 South, 
fUn^t 1 fcftttf thtnet t t i l l following tho Conttrrancy Liitrlct boundary 
oott to tho OAJV bank of tho Upptx Canal tnd nertfatttttrly Along tbo 
t a n bank of tho Upper Centl ond tbo Coaaamacy i l t t r i c t boundary to 
tho north bank of Dil l Creakj thonoo ootttrly Along tho north ban* of 
m i Cmtk to tht etntor of Highland DrlTt) thonet eoutbtaeteriy Along 
tht cantor of Hir.hland trivo And tho ConteHrancy fttiriot boundary to 
tho junetion of otid oratar of Highland Urire tnd tho contor l ino of 
5500 l>ojth rstxoatj thence « t i t Alone tho oonttr of $600 South i t r r t t 
to ih* oontnr of ?00 Last St root) thonco north alone tht center l ino 
of 700 i-aat Stroui to tho place of beginning* 
(h) tlvioion *••©• 6 to bo known AJ Union 3ivtaion« 
x 
ttccinnins on tbo oalX bonk of tho «ford*n llivor t t l t t junction 
with tho aeuth boundary of iAidrtlo City, otid point boing in tho worth 
' htlf of .'Motion 35i rovnthlp 2 South, Ktn^t 1 f« i t , S.l.D^W., And 
runaln^ the net oruthtrly tlon< tho oott btnk of tht Jordan nivor to 
tho juration of otid ottt book with tho touth atotion lino of Stction 
2, Tstnthlp 3 Juuth, Atngo 1 »ootf &*l*Z4iH,i tnd running thtneo t t t t 
Aloru tht ttction linot to tho Conttnraney i>lttriot ottt boundary l ino 
t t tho ^tithotit eorntr of.<^wotioo 3 t Townthip 3 So'ith, Kongo 1 i a t t | 
thenet north throt o i l t t , »»rt or l oo t , Along tho Contenrancjr J i t tr ic t 
;*tt boundAry l ino to tho horthtatt oornor of ttction 27, Totnthip 2 
r.onth, iUnvo 1 toot, 3«L*5AM,| tboneo o t t t to tht *outh»tot cornor of 
atotion 21} thtnet north to tho wool quarttr coratr of Motion 21, 
Tgwnahip 2 S<i>ithv Rangt 1 Cttt| thonoo oott Along otid Contorvincy 
i i t t r to t boundtry tnu ^uortor otetLon lino to tht junction of tn« o t t t* 
ottt eontor l int of Motion 20 with tho own tor l int of 900 U t t ^trttt) 
th«nct north tlon* th» e m u r l i m of 900 watt ^trttt to tho etntor 
l int of 5603 lo-ith *trett, ohich i t Alto tho wattorly boundAry of iUrrty 
Cityi tUnoe »«tt tnd oouth alon^ tho boundtry of toirr*j t i t / to th# 
boundary of iluvxlo tityi thonco touthtAtttrly tlon^ tho o t t t boiniary 
of wi-.wala City to the touth lino thoroofi thtnet wottcrly alorj; tho 
aejth boundary of »idvtlt City to tht oott Utnk of tnt Jordan hivtx, 
«6-
•Ivich la tl» placa of bofliJininci eaoludifif tharafroa, hovever, Ninety 
l l t y , ahioh la *ivition No% £• 
(1) : iv l t ion tio< 9 to bo ammn aa Craaoaot U T I O U I U 
All ot that portion of U» Conaanrancy tfiatriet o u t of tht aeat 
bank of the Jordan Kivtr and oe\ith of tha aouth tootlon liuot of 
.•Actions 3f J;t S and 6, In Tuanaldp J Couth, iUr^t 1 £*jt, end *»aetlen 
1 anu part of ; action a* In Toanahip 3 bc*»th, JUn t^ 1 *t t t , ahich eaid 
IlviJion i t eor© yirticuUrly doooribod aa fel loiai 
% Cooaancin,: t t tba Juration of tha aaet bank of tha Jordan Kitar 
aith tha aoalh aaetioa lino of S act Ion 2, Voir m hi? J South, #Un,?e X 
•t i t , ^ •L .JAN
 M and running thaaoa aoatharly aien« tlie attt bank of 
tha Jordan nlvor to tha Junotioo of aaid aaet bank of tha Jordan IHvar 
aith tha aoith boundary of tha Contemner t lotriot on tha quarter 
aaetion lino In Uooiion 10, Toanehlp U South, flense 1 Matt) thonoa aaet 
Xoiloeln* tho Conaervency i^iatrlet boundary to tha »eet quarter comer 
of taction 7j raeneiiip L »x»utht JUnxe 1 i-t it | and tha no* north j j a i l ee , 
Bote or le t % to tha iioutheeet comar of ^actios 199 Teanehip ) ^outh, 
«am*e 1 .'attj and thanea aaat 2 a l lee , sera or l e t t , to tha *©uthoatt 
corner of .action 20, Toantfcip 3 South, Kan«e 1 Satt; and thanoa north 
2 c i l t i , aore or lata, to tha I»outheatt corner of J'ootion 6, Temnahip 3 
'outh, Kark<a 1 l*e t | thonoa aaat 2 a l lee , aore or I a n , to tha South-
e t i l corner of Seotion 10, Toanehip 3 South, £an*?a 1 Uetf thanoa north 
1 a l io , aore or laat, to tha &outbe*at corner of faction j , Tovntrdp 3 
:<outh, i*an,?e I i*eat) thanoa eaat» departing fro* tha Contemncy Liatriet 
boundary 5f n l lot f aora or lata, alon«( tha aaetion Uoea to tha junction 
of tha aaet bank of the Jordan di?er aith tha aouth aaetion lina of 
. votlon 29 lomtliip 3 South, Hinge 1 *eet, ahioh ia tha plaoa of beglnnlnf* 
J. Xiwt tho bond fUod aa a part of tha a a proceeding to fuarantee tho 
poyrunt of coote in tho uvtmt tba foraation of tho dietrict mae not effected 
ia huroby einoalluJ and t!« t***doaon art harrby releaeed of any and a l l 
oblinationa thorounder. 
6* Vhat awilO diotriot ia properly ©rflaniaed aa r*iuirod by lav and a hall 
Xroa thia data fomard fuaction at a la tar Conaerrmoey Patriot purruint to 
tha previtiona of Tltla 100, Chaptar 11« OUh Coat AonoUUd 19U, aa aaandad9 
aith a l l U,a poaaraf privilanaa, dutiat and ianunitiaa praaoribad by laa. 
. latad thia U t h <iay of .'*pUab*r9 1951. 
•luc^a 
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RESOLUTION #88-34 C 
A RESOLUTION APPLYING TO THE METROPOLITAN WATER 
DISTRICT OF SALT LAKE CITY FOR A STATEMENT 
SHOWING INDEBTEDNESS OF THE DISTRICT, VALUE OF 
TAXABT-£ PROPERTY THEREIN, AND NAMES OF MUNICIPALITIES, 
THE AREAS OF WHICH ARE INCLUDED WITHIN THE DISTRICT. 
WHEREAS, Sandy City is currently considering annexation 
of property within its boundaries to the Metropolitan Water 
District of Salt Lake City; and 
WHEREAS, Section 73-8-49(2) of Utah Code Annotated 1953 
provides that a city shall apply to a metropolitan water 
district for a statement showing the amount of the bonded and 
other indebtedness of the district, the assessed value of the 
taxable property therein according to the most recent 
assessment, and the names of all municipalities, the areas of 
which are included within the district, preliminary to applying 
to the District for consent to annex; 
WHEREAS, it is in the best interest of the City, its 
residents, and property owners, to initiate the annexation 
process as set forth above; 
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED by the City Council of 
Sandy City, Utah as follows: 
1. It does hereby apply to the controller of the 
Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake City for a statement 
showing the amount of the bonded indebtedness and other 
indebtedness of the District, the assessed value of the taxable 
property therein according to the most recent assessment, and 
the names of all municipalities, the areas of which are 
included within the District, 
2. Upon receipt by the City of the controller's 
statement, the City Council shall place the same upon the 
Council's agenda for consideration, preliminary to application 
of the City for consent to annex the City to the District. 
^-) PASSED AND* APPROVED this " ^ c i a y of 
AV^ft-t^ 19BB. \ 
Bruce W. Steadman, Chairman 
Sandy City Council 
ATTEST: 
City Recorder AJsC/i.U-SZi^ / 
RECORDED this Z^_l day of T 7 ( ^ - ^ ^ 19 >,'j . 
V 
RESOLUTION #88-40 C 
A RESOLUTION APPLYING TO THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
OF THE METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT OF SALT LAKE 
CITY FOR CONSENT TO ANNEX SANDY CITY TO THE 
METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT 
WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 73-8-49(2) Utah Code Annotated 
1953, the City Council has applied to the Metropolitan Water 
District of Salt Lake City for a statement showing the amount 
of the bonded and other indebtedness .of the District, the 
assessed value of the taxable property therein according to the 
most recent assessment, and the names of all municipalities, 
the areas of which are included within the District; and 
WHEREAS, the City Council has received such statement from 
the District and considered the same together with other 
relevant information pertaining to annexation of the City to 
the District; and 
WHEREAS, the City Council has determined that it is in the 
best interest of the City, its residents, and property owners, 
to apply to the District for consent to annex; 
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED by the City Council of Sandy 
City, Utah as follows: 
1. It does hereby apply to the Board of Directors of the 
Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake City for consent to 
annex Sandy City to the District, and requests that the Board 
of Directors grant such application subject to such terms and 
conditions as may hereafter be fixed. 
2. The City Recorder is directed to certify a copy of this 
resolution and the Mayor is authorized to transmit the same to, 
the District's Board of Directors as soon as practicable 
thereafter. 
ADOPTED this /^^dav^f May, 19BB. 
Bruce W. Steadman, Chairman 
Sandy City Council 
ATTEST: 
JAMES S. JARDINE (A1647) 
BRENT W. TODD (A3276) and 
BRENT D. WRIDE (A5163) of 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Attorneys for Salt Lake County 
Water Conservancy District 
79 South Main Street 
P. 0. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Telephone: (801) 532-1500 
By. 
MAR 1 0 1989 
• Of~ctyi,pk 
KENDRICK J. HAFEN (A4217) 
3495 South 300 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Telephone: (801) 262-7421 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
OoOoo 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ORGANIZA-
TION OF THE SALT LAKE COUNTY 
WATER CONSERVANCY DISTRICT 
SANDY CITY, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY WATER 
CONSERVANCY DISTRICT, et al., 
Defendants. 
O R D E R 
Civil No. 92340 
(fit 
Civil No. 88-908315 CV 
Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
ooOoo 
All pending motions in the above-entitled case came on 
for hearing before the Court on February 3, 1989. Plaintiffs were 
represented by Walter R. Miller; Defendants were represented by 
James S. Jardine; D. Brent Rose appeared on behalf of Intervenor 
Grand County Water Conservancy District (-District-); and 
I. Robert Wall appeared on behalf of Intervenor West Valley City. 
The court heard oral arguments at that hearing and reviewed the 
briefs filed by the parties, and entered a Memorandum Decision on 
February 28, 1989. Based upon that Memorandum Decision, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
1. The motions to intervene of Grand County Water 
Conservancy District and West Valley City are granted. 
2. Defendants* Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint 
is granted on the following bases: 
a. The issues presented by Defendants* Motion to 
Dismiss are purely legal in nature. The factual affidavits 
submitted by Plaintiffs are not relevant to any of the legal 
issues raised by the Motion to Dismiss and thus are not applicable 
here. 
b. The First Claim for Relief is dismissed for the 
following reasons: 
(i) Section 73-8-50, UTAH CODE ANN. (1953), 
does not apply to or otherwise provide a procedure for 
withdrawal from water conservancy districts created under 
the Water Conservancy Act, section 78-9-1, et seq., UTAH 
CODE ANN. (1953); 
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(ii) Section 73-9-30, UTAH CODE ANN. (1953) does 
not provide authority for plaintiffs to withdraw from the 
District in this action since plaintiffs have not alleged 
compliance with the prerequisites of that section; 
(iii) This Court does not have the statutory 
authority or inherent power to create a separate 
procedure for Sandy City to withdraw from the District 
other than as expressly provided in the Utah Water 
Conservancy Act; 
c. The Second Claim for Relief is dismissed for the 
following reasons: 
(i) because Plaintiffs' challenge to the taxing 
powers of the District under the Water Conservancy 
District Act is contrary to clear Utah Supreme Court 
precedent. The District does have the power to levy 
taxes in accordance with the Legislative dictates through 
the enacted statute found at Section 73-9-15, UTAH CODE 
ANN. (1953); 
(ii) Sections 6.19 of the District's Master 
Resolution, adopted February 6, 1987, does not constitute 
a general obligation of the District nor does it require 
that an election be held for the approval of bonds issued 
thereunder. Further, Section 6.19 by its own terms does 
not require the District, during the life of any Bonds or 
-3-
contracts, to levy annually a tax up to the maximum 
amount provided by law except and to the extent that the 
District's Operation and Maintenance Costs are not 
otherwise paid from other District sources. 
d. The Third Claim for Relief is dismissed for the 
following reasons: 
(i) The notice of the District Board Meeting 
agenda for November 17, 1988, at which meeting the 
Resolution authorizing a Notice of Intent to Issue Bonds 
was discussed and passed, was sufficient under the 
requirements of the Open and Public Meetings Act, UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 52-4-6(2) (1953). 
(ii) The publication of the Notice of Intent to 
Issue Bonds was sufficient under the requirements of 
Section 73-9-32(5), UTAH CODE ANN. (1988 Supp.), and was 
not otherwise legally inadequate in content and notice to 
the public. 
e. The Fourth Claim for Relief is dismissed because 
the Court lacks statutory authority or inherent power to order, 
approve or fashion the election procedure requested by Plaintiffs 
therein. 
3. As a result of the granting of the Motion to Dismiss, 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is moot and 
therefore denied. 
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4. The Amended Complaint is hereby dismissed, 
DATED this fO day of MaLCh#flft89. 
Approved as to Form: 
re Honorable Timothy ,R. Jianson 
'District Judge A"; T i-"-
c> &''^ I.-
Walter R. Miller 
Sandy City Attorney 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
•5-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 9 "~ day of March, 1989, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Order was hand delivered to 
the following: 
Walter R. Miller 
Attorney for Sandy City 
440 East 8680 South 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
D. Brent Rose 
CLYDE & PRATT 
Attorney for Grand County Water 
Conservancy District 
77 West 200 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Paul T. Morris 
I. Robert Wall 
Attorney for West Valley City 
2470 Redwood Road 
West Valley City, Utah 84119 
Keith L. Stoney 
Attorney for Bluffdale City 
2470 South Redwood Road 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84119 
j-hMsu— 
2292J 
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